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BEYOND THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE 
POWER: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF 
AGENCY RULEMAKING UNDER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,291 
Morton Rosenberg* 
Carrying out a campaign promise to eliminate burdensome and 
unnecessary government regulations, President Reagan recently 
signed Executive Order 12,291 into law.I The Order aims to im-
prove the efficiency and accountability of the informal rulemaking 
processes of executive agencies. The heart of the Order is its require-
ment that "major''2 rules survive cost-benefit analysis. Section 2, 
which applies to the extent permitted by law, stipulates that regula-
tory action may not be undertaken unless, "taking into account af-
fected industries [and] the condition of the national economy," the 
potential benefits to society outweigh potential costs, and net benefits 
are at a maximum.3 
,! Specialist in American Public Law, Congressional Research Service, The Library of 
Congress. B.A. 1957, New York University; LL.B. 1960, Harvard University. - Ed. 
The views presented in this Article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the 
thinking of the Congressional Research Service. 
1. 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). The Order applies only to executive agencies, and does not 
affect independent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Justice 
Department originally argued that the President could subject independent regulatory com- · 
missions to the Order, but they were exempted on "policy grounds." See C. LUDLAM, UNDER-
MINING PuBLIC PROTECTIONS: THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION REGULATORY PROGRAM 7 
(1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., July 20, 1981, at 
1. A more recent memorandum prepared for the Office of Management and Budget, however, 
has recommended ''that the White House pressure the independent commissions in a variety 
of ways to bring them under the President's control" C. LUDLAM, supra, at 7. See LEGAL 
TIMES OF WASH., June 1, 1981, at 1. To date, the Administration has only sought voluntary 
compliance with the Order from the independent agencies. LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Oct. 5, 
1981, at 5. 
2. The Order defines a major rule as a regulation likely to result in an annual effect on the 
economy exceeding $100 million, a major increase in costs or prices, or a significant effect on 
unemployment or other economic indicators. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § l(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 
13,193 (1981). 
3. Sec. 2. General RetJUirements. In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing 
regulations, and developmg legislative proposals concerning regulation, all agencies, to 
the extent permitted by law, shall adhere to the following requirements: 
(a) Administrative decisions shall be based on adequate information concerning the 
need for and consequences of proposed government action; 
(b) Regulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to soci-
ety for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society; 
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize the net benefits to society; 
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regulatory objective, the alternative 
involving tlie least net cost to society shall be chosen; and 
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To implement its cost-benefit standard, the Order imposes cer-
tain mandatory procedural requirements on agencies and creates a 
centralized oversight body composed of the President's top advisers. 
The Order provides, among other things, that executive agencies 
must prepare "Regulatory Impact Analyses" (RIAS) detailing the 
potential costs and benefits of all proposed and final "major" rules.4 
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (0MB), who, 
subject to the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, has au-
thority over the definition, implementation, and enforcement of the 
Order's provisions, reviews all RIAs and can force the agency to de-
lay publication of proposed or final rules.5 
Although Executive Order 12,291 is the latest in a series of recent 
presidential efforts to control informal rulemaking, 6 the nature of the 
Order's oversight mechanism, the extent of its required procedures, 
and the substantive import of its cost-benefit requirement are un-
precedented. In the past, less formalized presidential intervention 
into agency decision-making has stirred both court action and con-
gressional hearings.7 If, as published reports indicate, the Order's 
stated purposes8 are pursued vigorously,9 it will undoubtedly attract 
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim of maximizing the aggregate 
net benefits to society, taltlng into account the condition of the particular industries 
affected by the regulations, the condition of the national economy, and other regula-
tory actions contemplated for the future. 
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
4. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,494-95 (1981). 
5. (f)(l) Upon the request of the Director, an agency shall consult with the Director 
concerning the review of a preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis or notice of proposed 
rulemaltlng under this Order, and shall, subject to Section 8(a)(2) of this Order, refrain 
from publishing its preliminary Regulatory Impact Analysis or notice of proposed 
rulemaltlng until such review is concluded. 
(2) Upon receiving notice that the Director intends to submit views with respect to 
any final Regulatory Impact Analysis or .final rule, the agency shall, subject to Section 
8(a)(2) of this Order, refrain from publishing its .final Regulatory Impact Analysis or final 
rule until the agency has responded to the Director's view, and incorporated those views 
and the agency's response in the rulemaltlng file. 
Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3{f), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
6. See notes 101-04 infra and accompanying text. 
7. For private challenges to presidential intervention, see, e.g., American Petroleum Inst. v. 
Costle, Nos. 79-1104, 79-1201, et al., slip op. (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 1981); Sierra Club v. Costle, 
657 F.2d 298, 386-410 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litiga-
tion, 13 E.R.C. 1586 (D.D.C. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Schultze, 12 E.R.C, 
1737 (D.D.C. 1979); Naderv. Volpe, 340 F. Supp. 1178 (D.D.C.), qffd, 446 F.2d 261 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). For congressional hearings provoked by presidential intervention, see Executive Branch 
Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Suhcomm. on Environmental Pollu-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Regu-
latory Reform Legislation, Pl. 2: Hearings on S. 262 Before the Suhcomm. on Administrative 
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 
8. The preamble states the Order's purposes as: "reduc[ing] the burdens of existing and 
future regulations, increas[ing] agency accountability for regulatory actions, provid[ing] for 
presidential oversight of the regulatory process, 'minimiz(ing] duplication and conflict of regu-
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congressional attention and challenges in court by adversely affected 
individuals. Already, critics of the Order have expressed fears that 
0MB oversight will serve as a "conduit" for the views of private 
industry, 10 and have attacked the Order's cost-benefit requirement as 
a thinly disguised ''justification for deregulating business and 
industry."11 
This Article addresses the substantial legal problems posed by 
Executive Order 12,291. Part I argues that the Order, taken as a 
whole or separated into its procedural and substantive components, 
violates the constit~tional separation of powers. Drawing on the an-
alytic framework outlined by Justice Jackson in the Steel Seizure 
case, 12 Part I maintains that courts should demand clear congres-
sional support for the Order's requirements. The available evidence, 
however, conclusively demonstrates Congress's intent to deny the 
President formalized, substantive control over administrative policy-
making. As interpreted by the Supreme Court, moreover, the infor-
mal rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(AP A) repose authority to require additional procedures solely with 
the agency, not with the President or his advisers. 
Part II addresses the legitimacy of ex parte communications be-
tween White House and agency officials, a problem that is exacer-
bated by the Order's oversight provisions. Because agencies 
typically attribute great weight to the views of the President and his 
closest advisers, such unrecorded and unreviewable communications 
threaten to deprive individuals of due process and to distort the 
AP A's provisions for judicial review and public participation. Ac-
cordingly, Part II argues that significant oral or written communica-
tions between the White House and an agency should be disclosed in 
the rulemaking docket and that courts should invalidate agency ac-
tion where this disclosure requirement has not been fulfilled. 
I. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 
A. The President's Constitutional Authority 
The prestige and aura of tp.e presidential office accompany Exec-
lations and insur[ing) well-reasoned regulations." Exec. Order No. 12,291 Preamble, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 13,193 (1981). . 
9. Deregulation HQ: An Interview with Mullay L. Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III, 
REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1981, at 14-23. 
10. See LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., OcL 5, 1981, at5; LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., June 22, 1981, 
at 1. 
11. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 1. 
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
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utive Order 12,291, but it is undisputed that its legitimacy depends 
on the scope of the President's constitutional and statutory author-
ity.13 Notwithstanding this fundamental proposition, Executive Or-
der 12,291 does not appear to draw its authority from any specific 
constitutional provision or congressional enactment; the Order itself 
refers only to "the authority vested in ... [the] President by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States of America."14 If the le-
gal basis for presidential oversight and management of the rulemak-
ing process lies within the Constitution, it will be found in the 
provisions of article II, which have not been extensively tested in the 
courts. 
Article II of the Constitution reposes all executive power in a sin-
gle Chief Executive, 15 and charges him to "take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed."16 Whether article II authorizes the President 
to manage administrative rulemaking through executive orders, 
however, is open to question. On its face, article II sets out a poten-
tially formidable scheme for executive control of administration. By 
vesting the entire "executive Power'' in the one federal officer with a 
national constituency, the framers accommodated the twin notions 
of accountability and efficiency. The sparse but important provi-
sions that follow develop lines of authority reflecting the competing 
claims of administrative necessity and the separation of powers. The 
President can appoint executive officers17 and require them to report 
to him so that he can determine whether the laws are being "faith-
fully executed."18 This ability to require reports necessarily implies 
the right to confer with those officers. The President in tum must 
periodically report to Congress concerning the progress of the ad-
ministrative operation and may suggest further legislative action. 
For some, this scheme implies operational oversight and manage-
ment of the administrative process, if not some degree of substantive 
control, and suggests a line of authority that runs from Congress to 
the President rather than from Congress to subordinate executive 
officers. 
For others, however, these inferences are not so clear. It is well 
understood that, notwithstanding their experience under the Articles 
of Confederation, the framers did not intend the presidency to be an 
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
14. Exec. Order No. 12,291 Preamble, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cL 2. 
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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institutional competitor to the Congress. Arguably, they did not 
conceive of the President as an administrative manager with a gen-
eral power to control the acts of executive officers.19 This view also 
draws support from the language of article II. The vesting of "exec-
utive power'' in the President may locate the situs of power but not 
define its content; the "take Care" clause does not say that the Presi-
dent will execute the laws; and the ability to require written reports 
from department heads on their activities does not naturally lead to 
an inference of power to direct the activities of those who report. 
The wording may thus suggest oversight of execution by others 
rather than direct execution by the President. The idea that power 
over administrative decision-making derives from the President's 
role as head of the executive branch or inheres in the concept of 
"executive power," moreover, is inconsistent with a written Constitu-
tion establishing divided, limited government. 
Like the language of the Constitution, the case law provides few 
solid conclusions concerning the President's authority to act by exec-
utive order in domestic affairs. Although in rare instances the 
Supreme Court has relied on one of the President's constitutionally 
specified powers to sustain an executive order,20 orders have most 
often been upheld by virtue of a specific congressional authoriza-
tion.21 The Court has not held, however, that the President can val-
idly act by executive order only where a legislative enactment 
specifically delegates him the requisite authority. It has instead 
19. [I]t was undoubtedly intended that the President should be little more than a polit-
ical chief; that is to say, one whose function should, in the main, consist in the perform-
ance of those political duties which are not subject to judicial control. It is quite clear that 
it was intended that he should not, except as to these political matters, be the administra-
tive head of the Government, with general power of directing and controlling the acts of 
subordinate Federal administrative agents. 
3 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1479-80 (2d ed. 
1929). See F. GOODNOW, COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 51-54 (1893); Corwin, The 
Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 CoLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953); Jaffee, 
Invective and Investigation in Administrative Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1203, 1238 (1939); 
Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. I, 10-11 ("Nor did 
[the framers] conceive of the presidency as an institutionalized representation of popular will 
distinct from, let alone capable of opposition to, the will expressed by the legislature."); Zamir, 
Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 866, 869-70 (1969). 
20. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872). 
21. See Old Dominion No. 496, AFL-CIO v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 273 n.5 (1974); Jones v. 
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 217 (1890); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 796 (D.C. Cir.) (en 
bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 888 (1979). On occasion, subsequent legislation has been found to 
ratify an earlier order, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944); Hiraba-
yashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91 (1943); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 671 
(1862), and some cases have even held that continued congressional funding of a program 
created by executive order constitutes sufficient ratification, see Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking 
& Lumber Co., 331 U.S. lll, ll8-19 (1942); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360-61 (1941); 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 482-83 (1915). 
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skirted the more difficult separation of powers issues, and has said 
little regarding the President's unilateral authority to act in domestic 
affairs and the strength of the statutory support needed to justify his 
action. 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,22 better known as the 
Steel Seizure case, stands as the exception. To prevent a strike in the 
steel industry, President Truman issued an executive order, based 
solely on his constitutional powers,23 directing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize and operate most of the country's steel mills. The 
Supreme Court invalidated the order, holding that the President had 
violated the constitutional separation of powers. Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Black articulated a separation of powers theory that 
would also doom Executive Order 12,291. Justice Black's theory 
rests on a rigid distinction between legislative and executive power.24 
According to Justice Black, other than the constitutionally specified 
authority to recommend and veto legislation, the President has no 
power to make law: The Constitution explicitly vests lawmaking 
power in the Congress. Applying Justice Black's compartmentalized 
approach, one could argue that executive control of administrative 
rulemaking usurps Congress's constitutional lawmaking role. The 
Court has recognized the essentially legislative nature of rulemaking, 
and has sharply curtailed the President's control over rulemaking 
agencies.25 Because rulemaking in e.ff ect involves the power to make 
law, Justice Black's theory implies that the President may not unilat-
erally act to control the rulemaking process. 
Justice Black's separation of powers analysis, however, has been 
22. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
23. During the debate on the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress had rejected an amendment that 
would have authorized executive seizure, in an emergency situation, of means of production 
threatened by labor-management strife. The President twice advised Congress of his action, 
but it took no countermeasures. 
24. Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the several constitutional provi-
sions that grant executive power to the President. . . . The Constitution limits his func-
tions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the 
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about 
who shall make laws which the President is to execute. . . . 
The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in 
both good and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of 
power and the hopes of freedom that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but 
confirm our holding that this seizure order cannot stand. 
343 U.S. at 587-89. 
25. See text at notes 62-75 infta. q: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 n.l, 542 n.16 (1978) (due process ordinarily 
does not require procedures more rigorous than those prescribed by Congress in rulemaking 
proceedings); Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (action of State Board of 
Equalization analogized to action of legislature). 
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widely criticized as ''unduly simplistic" and unworkable.26 In place 
of Black's view of mutually exclusive spheres of legislative and exec-
utive power, a more "complex understanding of governmental au-
thority ... [as] shared by reciprocally limiting branches"27 has been 
urged. Justice Jackson's famous concurring opinion in the Steel 
Seizure case outlines one such understanding. "Presidential pow-
ers," he declared, "are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress."28 Justice Jack-
son delineated three types of presidential power.29 He acknowl-
edged that the executive and legislative branches each possess a 
realm of autonomous authority. The President, in other words, pos-
sesses certain exclusive powers that Congress cannot abrogate or de-
limit. Congress cannot, one supposes, deprive the President of his 
constitutionally specified power to appoint executive officials. Con-
gress likewise possesses certain exclusive powers. In this sphere of 
exclusive congressional authority, the President may not legitimately 
act unless Congress has validly delegated power to him. Unlike Jus-
tice Black, however, Justice Jackson also envisaged a third category 
- a "zone of twilight"30 in which the President and Congress have 
concurrent authority. In this twilight zone, the President does not 
need a congressional delegation of power to justify his actions; he 
may legitimately act as long as Congress has not expressly or im-
26. Bruff,Presidential Power and Administrative Ru/emaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451,472 (1979). 
27. Id at 487. 
28. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
29. l. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right 
plus all that Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be 
said (for what it may be worth), to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act is held 
unconstitutional under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Govern-
ment as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure executed by the President pursuant to 
an Act of Congress would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon 
any who might attack it. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twi-
light in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution 
is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference, or quiescence may sometimes, 
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives 
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. 
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied 
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. 
Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential jurisdiction in such a case only by disabling the 
Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclu-
sive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the equilib-
rium established by our constitutional system. 
343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
30. 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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pliedly denied him the power. Congress, however, retains ultimate 
control since the President must abide by its expressed will.31 
Justice Jackson's tripartite framework furnishes a provocative 
starting point for analysis. To assess the validity of Executive Order 
12,291, one must first ask whether the Order falls within the exclu-
sive domain of one branch or whether the President and Congress 
possess concurrent authority in the area. It seems obvious that the 
President cannot' have exclusive authority to control informal 
rulemaking. The Supreme Court has recognized that an agency acts 
as a legislative body when it promulgates rules and thus has limited 
presidential control over the rulemaking process.32 Even if the Or-
der is viewed as purely procedural, it would be anomalous to hold 
that Congress may mandate the general substantive standards to 
which rules must conform but may not establish the procedures that 
an agency must use to formulate those rules. At the very least, there-
fore, Congress possesses concurrent authority to act in the area cov-
ered by Executive Order 12,291. 
The more troubling question is whether the Order intrudes on an 
exclusive province of Congress. If it operates within an area where 
Congress's powers are exclusive, an executive order can be sustained 
only if an express or impli~d delegation can be discerned. If the 
President has concurrent authority, however, an order may be up-
held as long as it does not contradict the intent of Congress. Al-
though Justice Jackson did not discuss how to determine whether a 
given action by the President falls within the twilight zone of concur-
rent authority or encroaches upon Congress's exclusive authority, 
three factors suggest themselves as especially relevant:33 (1) the in-
stitutional competence of each branch, 34 (2) the historic and proper 
role of each branch, and (3) the degree to which the executive action 
in question intrudes on a function appropriately entrusted to the leg-
3 l. See note 29 supra; The Yale Paper, Indochina: The Conslilulional Crisis, Par/ I I, 116 
CONG. REC. 16,478, 16,479 (1970) ("Furthermore, the lesson of the steel seizure case itself is 
that the legislative will must prevail when there is conflict within the twilight zone.") [hereinaf-
ter cited as The Yale Paper]. 
32. See notes 62-75 iefra and accompanying text. 
33. CJ; Bruff, supra note 26, at 488: 
At least six questions should be considered in an evaluation of the legitimacy of a 
given presidential initiative aimed at influencing agency regulatory policy: 
(I) is there express or implied statutory authority for the initiative; (2) does the Presi-
dent have the capacity to execute the initiative; (3) is the initiative best characterized as 
procedural or substantive; (4) is the regulatory program suited to presidential interven-
tion of the kind attempted; (5) what protections are accorded to ensure that the rulemak-
ing process remains an open one that is fair to those concerned; and (6) are effective 
checks by the other branches of government available. 
34. The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479. 
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islature. By applying these factors, one can intelligently evaluate the 
congressional support that should be required to sustain Executive 
Order 12,291. 
The first factor, institutional competence, refers to the compara-
tive advantages inherent in the operation of each branch. Because ' 
the President possesses final authority over his actions, he can make 
decisions and take action more quickly than can Congress.35 Con-
gress, by design, acts more slowly as issues are debated, compromises 
made, consensus built, and differences between the two houses rec-
onciled. 36 Another crucial difference concerns the relative openness 
of the two branches to public scrutiny. While legislation is subject to 
an on-the-record public debate, only the final outcome of executive 
decision-making need be publicly disclosed. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has held that the President has a constitutionally protected 
interest in the confidentiality of communications with his chief ad-
visers. 37 These differences suggest that the President is best suited to 
act in emergency situations, where speed is at a premium, and in 
35. The President can act more quickly than the Congress. The President with the 
armed services at his disposal can move with force as well as speed. All executive power 
- from the reign of ancient kings to the rule of modem dictators - has the outward 
appearance of efficiency. 
Legislative power, by contrast, is slower to exercise. There must be delay while the 
ponderous machinery of committees, hearings, and debates is put into motion. That takes 
time; and while the Congress slowly moves into action, the emergency may take its toll in 
wages, consumer goods, war production, the standard of living of the people, and perhaps 
even lives. Legislative action may indeed often be cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
apparently inefficient. 
343 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). In a similar vein, it has been noted that 
[t]he special competence of the office of the Presidency is its capacity for fast, efficient, and 
decisive action. Power in the executive branch is hierarchical; in Congress it is diffuse. 
Decisions in the legislative branch are made according to complex procedural rules in two 
separate institutions; in the White House they can be made by one man. The essence of 
the legislative process is deliberation and compromise; in the executive process, at least in 
theory, it is command. 
The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479. 
36. The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, 
not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose 
was not to avoid friction but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribu-
tion of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from 
autocracy. · 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 55, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), quoted in Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
Speed and efficiency, however, are not the proper ends of government. If they were, 
the framers would have created a dictatorship. The main theme underlying the Constitu-
tion is, of course, the desire to temper the decisiveness of a President with the prudence 
inherent in a large body which acts through deliberation, compromise, and consensus. 
And it is that prudence, coupled with the fact that Congress is closer to the People and 
reflects the diversity of their views, that gives rise to its special competence, a unique 
legitimacy to commit the resources and will of the nation. 
The Yale Paper, supra note 31, at 16,479 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). See 
Gewirtz, The Courts, Congress, and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1976, at 46, 47. 
37. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
202 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 80:193 
foreign affairs, where an open decision-making process might dam-
age the national interest or hinder a thorough consideration of the 
relevant issues. This understanding of the President's competence 
might explain why most Justices, unlike Justice Black, found the 
Steel Seizure case difficult. Most of the Justices, perhaps because the 
case arguably involved an emergency touching on national security 
concerns, were willing to interpret the President's authority expan-
sively. A close reading of the concurring and dissenting opinions 
reveals that a majority38 of the Justices thought that President Tru-
man's action was, in Justice Jackson's terms, within the twilight zone 
of concurrent authority. Disagreement arose only over whether 
Congress had impliedly denied the President authority to act. 
Executive Order 12,291 stands in sharp contrast to President Tru-
man's decision to seize the steel mills. Few would seriously contend 
that agency rulemaking has created a crisis situation necessitating a 
swift response or has somehow jeopardized the nation's security. 
The special competence of the office of the presidency is thus not 
needed to correct deficiencies in the rulemaking process. Public de-
bate and legislative compromise are possible and, because the Order 
al~ers the way that fundamental domestic policies are formulated, 
desirable. 
The desirability of legislative rather than presidential action 
points to the second factor affecting the categorization of the Order: 
the historic and proper role of each branch of government. The 
Constitution, of course, does not speak directly to the control of the 
federal bureaucracy. The proper role of the President must, there-
fore, be implied from his constitutional authority to appoint execu-
tive officers and to require reports from his subordinates, and from 
his duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."39 Con-
sideration of the express and implied powers accorded the President 
by article II, however, should not end the inquiry. The Constitu-
tion's general grant of legislative power to Congress40 further delim-
its the President's authority to regulate domestic affairs. According 
to the prevailing view, the framers intended the constitutional role of 
the Chief Executive, at least in domestic affairs, to be ancillary to 
that of the legislature.41 They believed that the President would be a 
38. See 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); 343 U.S. at 655 (Burton, J., concurring); 
343 U.S. at 660 (Clark, J., concurring); 343 U.S. at 667 (Vinson, C.J., Minton, J. & Reed, J., 
dissenting). 
39. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
41. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 161, 181 (1978). 
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managerial agent for the legislature rather than an independent 
source of domestic policy.42 This view is evinced by a number of 
contemporaneous sources. Statutes enacted by the earliest Con-
gresses, for example, reveal an assumption that Congress, not the 
President, should direct the operation of domestic agencies, and that 
presidential control over the execution of domestic laws was purely a 
matter of legislative authorization. In establishing the Departments 
of Foreign Affairs,43 War,44 and the Navy,45 Congress recognized 
that the President should have full control over those officers who 
would perform the highly sensitive and political functions that the 
Constitution explicitly vests in the Chief Executive - such as the 
conduct of foreign affairs and the command of the military. The 
statutes creating those departments explicitly empowered the Presi-
dent to direct and control their activities. Provision for presidential 
direction, however, was conspicuously absent in the statutes creating 
domestic departments such as the Treasury,46 the Post Office,47 and 
the Interior Department.48 The Treasury Department statute, for ex-
ample, did not even mention the President; it required the Secretary 
to report to Congress "and generally perform all such services rela-
tive to the finances, as he shall be directed to perform."49 Such di-
rection, the context makes clear, was to come from Congress, not the 
President. Indeed, for a significant period in our early history, the 
President did not see departmental budget estimates before the 
Treasury Department transferred them to Congress, and the Secre-
tary recommended tax policy directly to Congress.50 Similarly, the 
Postmaster General was given detailed discretionary duties with no 
suggestion that he was to be under other than congressional direction 
in performing these tasks. 51 
42. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
43. Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, § 1, l Stat. 28. 
44. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, § 1, l Stat. 49. 
45. Act of Apr. 30, 1798, ch. 35, § 1, l Stat. 553. 
46. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, 1 Stat. 65, 66. 
47. Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, l Stat. 357. 
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 1, 9 Stat. 395. 
49. Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, § 2, l Stat. 65, 66. 
50. L WHITE, THE JACKSONIANS 78 {1954); L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 326 {1948). 
51. W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 19, at 1480. Professor Goodnow remarked about this 
unusual administrative organization as follows: 
In the United States, the original conception of the head of department was that of an 
officer stationed at the center of the government who might have, it is true, in many cases 
the power of appointment and removal, but who was not supposed to direct the actions of 
the subordinates of his department. • . . The conception of a hierarchy of subordinate 
and superior officers was very dim if it existed at all. 
F. GOODNOW, supra note 19, at 136-37. 
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The opinions of Attorneys General throughout the nineteenth 
century echo the view that the "take Care" clause does not authorize 
the President to control subordinate officials in the exercise of their 
statutory discretion. For example, when pensioners tried to appeal 
the Comptroller's decision regarding the level of veterans' pensions 
directly to the President, Attorney General Wirt advised that the 
Comptroller's statutory authority was exclusive: 
If the laws, then, require a particular officer by name to perform a 
duty, not only is that officer bound to perform it; but no other officer 
can perform it without a violation of the law; and were the President to 
perform it, he would not only be taking care that the laws were faith-
fully executed, but he would be violating them himself. 52 
In the same vein, Attorney General Mason concluded in 1846 that 
the President's power to ensure that his subordinates "faithfully" ex-
ecute their statutory duties does not confer on him "the power of 
cqrrecting, by his own official action, the errors of judgment of in-
competent or unfaithful subordinates."53 Other Attorneys General 
applied this rule to a wide variety of situations where a subordinate 
was directly vested with authority by Congress,54 so that, by 1884, 
Attorney General Brewster could inform the President of a "well set-
tled" general rule: "It has repeatedly been held that the observance 
of your constitutional duty of taking care that the laws be faithfully 
executed does not of itself warrant your taking part in the discharge 
of duties devolved by law upon an executive officer."55 
52. l Op. Atty. Gen. 624, 625-26 (1823). 
The Constitution of the United States requires that the laws be faithfully executed; 
that is, it places the officers engaged in the execution of the laws under his general super-
intendence; . . . But it never could have been the intention of the Constitution, in as-
signing this general power to the President . . . that he should in person execute the laws 
himself .... The Constitution assigns to Congress the power of designating the duties of 
particular officers: the President is only required to take care that they execute them faith-
fully. . . . He is not to perform the duty, but to see that the officer assigned by Jaw 
performs his duty faithfully - that is, honestly: not with perfect correctness of judgment, 
but honestly. 
Id. at 625-26 (emphasis in original). 
53. 4 Op. Atty. Gen. 515, 516 (1846). 
54. For example, the President was told that he could not interfere with a patent decision, 
13 Op. Atty. Gen. 28 (1869), and that he had no authority to review a department head's 
decision concerning the lowest bidder on a contract, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 226 (1853). 
55. 18 Op. Atty. Gen. 31, 33 (1884). See l Op. Atty. Gen. 624 (1823); I Op. Atty. Gen. 705 
(1825); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 480, 481 (1831); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 507, 508 (1832) (Comptroller's 
decision "is conclusive upon the executive branch of government"); 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 544 
(1832); 5 Op. Atty. Gen. 630, 635 (1852) (presidential interference "would be a usurpation on 
the part of the President, which the accounting officers would not be bound to respect" unless 
Congress expressly ordered them to do so); 11 Op. Atty. Gen. 14 (1864); 13 Op. Atty. Gen. 28 
(1869); 15 Op. Atty. Gen. 94, 101-02 (1876). The opinions are not unanimous, however. See 7 
Op. Atty. Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855). In Attorney General Cushing's view, a denial of the power 
of presidential direction would allow Congress to "so divide and transfer the executive power 
as utterly to subvert Government." The opinion was called "extreme" by a prominent early 
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The original view of the limited nature of presidential control 
over the discretionary actions of subordinate officers is confirmed by 
contemporaneous judicial precedent as well. In Kendall v. United 
States,56 for example, a statute directed the Postmaster General to 
pay a group of individuals who had delivered the mail for a number 
of years an amount determined by the Solicitor. The Postmaster 
General, apparently at the express direction of the President, refused 
to pay the full amount that the Solicitor had found owing. The 
Supreme Court, viewing the Postmaster General's duty to pay the 
full amount as ministerial rather than discretionary, held that the 
President had no authority to direct the Postmaster General's per-
formance of his statutory duty. Despite the Kendall Court's narrow 
holding, key passages in the opinion reflect the nineteenth-century 
notion that the President may not direct the manner in which execu-
tive officers carry out their discretionary functions. Where Congress 
has imposed upon an executive officer a valid duty, the Kendall 
Court declared, "the duty and responsibility grow out of and are 
subject to the control of the law, and not to the direction of the Presi-
dent."57 Underlying the Court's rejection of the contention that the 
"take Care" clause carries with it the power to control executive offi-
cials was a strong desire to avoid "clothing the President with the 
power entirely to control the legislation of Congress."58 Other early 
cases, like Kendall, also reflect the primacy of Congress in domestic 
affairs.59 Congressional enactments, legal opinions of the various At-
torneys General, and early judicial precedent thus establish that the 
President's role in the scheme of government established by the Con-
stitution for more than a century of our nation's existence was that of 
a managerial agent for the legislature.60 This prevailing view was 
premised on the assumption that presidential power was not essen-
commentator. F. GOODNOW, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 81 (1905). 
56. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). 
57. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610. 
58. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613. 
59. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,516 (1911) (holding Secretary of Agricul-
ture to be an agent ofCongess in promulgating "administrative" rules); United States v. Per-
kins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886) (holding that where Congress vests the power of appointment in 
some official other than the President, it can regulate and restrict the manner of removing that 
appointee); Ex Parle Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney, 
C.J.) ("The only power .•. which the President possesses, where the 'life, liberty or property' 
of a private citizen are concerned, is the power and duty . . . 'that he shall take care that the 
laws shall be faithfully executed.' He is not authorized to execute them himself, or through 
agents or officers, civil or military, appointed by himself, but he is to take care that they be 
faithfully carried into execution."). The continuing validity of Perkins was affirmed in Myers 
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926). 
60. As late as 1885, Woodrow Wilson could suggest in his Congressional Government that 
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tially constitutionally based, but emanated from the legislative will, 
an assumption that traced its roots to the reasons for founding the 
Republic.61 This view, moreover, carries with it the concomitant no-
tion that presidential e.ff orts to control the administrative actions of 
subordinate officers must find their bases in explicit constitutional 
provisions, express statutory enactments, or the clearest of implica-
tions from a congressional mandate or course of practice. The lack 
of congressional prohibition is, undei: this view, insufficient in itself 
to support executive power to control administrative discretion, even 
indirectly. 
While the President's authority directly to control his subordi-
nates' performance of specific statutory duties occupied the attention 
of legal scholars and the courts in the nineteenth century, twentieth-
century judicial precedents address a more indirect means of influ-
ence: the President's power to remove subordinate officials. Myers v. 
United States,62 the leading case, held unconstitutional a statute pro-
viding that postmasters appointed by the President with the Senate's 
consent shall hold office for four years unless "removed by the Presi-
dent by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."63 The Presi-
dent's responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed," the Court reasoned, demands that he have unqualified 
authority to remove as well as to appoint subordinate officials. 64 
Chief Justice Taft's majority opinion has been read as discerning 
broad supervisory power vested in the President by article II: The 
President, he concluded, must have the authority to "supervise and 
guide" at least some decisions of subordinate officers "to secure that 
unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II . . . evi-
dently contemplated in vesting general executive power in the Presi-
dent alone."65 
Although the Justice Department's legal memorandum accompa-
nying Executive Order 12,291 relies heavily on the interpretation 
given the "take Care" clause by Chief Justice Taft in Myers,66 such 
the presidency was at best a ceremonial and symbolic office in need of executive and adminis-
trative suppport from a reorganized Congress. See Zamir, supra note 19, at 871-73. 
61. See Karl, supra note 19, at 11. 
62. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
63. 272 U.S. at 107 (quoting Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 80, 81). 
64. 272 U.S. at 117. 
65. 272 U.S. at 135. 
66. Memorandum of Acting Assistant Attorney General Larry L. Simms, Proposed Execu-
tive Order Entitled "Federal Regulation," February 13, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Simms 
Memo] (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). \ 
More specifically, the Justice Department memorandum reasons as follows. It' first sets 
forth the general constitutional principles perceived as underlying presidential authority. The 
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reliance is misplaced. The indirect power of removal differs signifi-
cantly from the Order's conception-to-enactment influence over ad-
ministrative rulemaking, and the Court's opinion nowhere goes so 
far as to hold that the President may direct the outcome of all deci-
sions specifically committed by statute to a subordinate. The Court 
carefully distinguished the "ordinary duties of officers prescribed by 
statute" from those duties "so peculiarly and specifically committed 
to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether 
the President may overrule or revise the officer's interpretation of his 
statutory duty in a particular instance."67 Because the former duties 
"come under the general administrative control of the President," he 
may properly "supervise and guide" their performance.68 But Taft's 
opinion makes clear that the Chief Executive's power to "supervise 
and guide" his subordinates in the conduct of "ordinary duties"69 
prescribed by statute does not extend to the rulemaking and adjudi-
catory functions committed by law to his subordinates' discretion. 
The President may remove a subordinate for negligent or inefficient 
use of that discretion; he may not, however, exercise his removal 
power before the subordinate has exercised the personally commit-
ted discretion. 70 
"take Care" clause, as construed in Myers, is asserted to authorize the President, as head of the 
Executive Branch, to "supervise and guide" executive officers in carrying out the statutes 
under which they act so that there can be some measure of uniformity in the interpretation and 
execution of diverse laws enacted by Congress. A denial of such guidance from the sole officer 
vested with the executive power under the Constitution could result in confusion and inconsis-
tency among government agencies. On the other hand, it is conceded that Congress may so 
delimit a delegation of authority to a subordinate official as to preclude presidential supervi-
sion of decision-making. Such cases are rare, it is argued, and it must be presumed that when 
Congress delegates rulemaking authority to the heads of nonindependent agencies, it is aware 
that they are removable at the will of the President. It would thus be anomalous to believe that 
Congress would make such delegations with a lack of understanding of the existence of that 
control relationship. From these premises it is concluded that the standard to be applied for 
determining the permissible extent of presidential guidance and supervision is to be based on 
the degree of displacement of subordinate officer discretion. "[S]upervision is more readily 
justified when it does not purport wholly to displace, but only to guide and limit, discretion 
which Congress has allocated to a particular subordinate official. A wholesale displacement 
might be held inconsistent with the statute vesting authority in the relevant official." Id at 4. 
67. 272 U.S. at 135. 
68. 272 U.S. at 135. 
69. The structure of this critical paragraph supports an argument that by "ordinary duties" 
Taft meant ministerial tasks or purely administrative duties not involving substantive decision-
making since that passage is immediately followed by passages that clearly set apart rulemak-
ing and adjudicatory functions. If so, the power to "supervise and guide" is of minimal 
substance. 
70. Of course there may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the discre-
tion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or 
revise the officer's interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance. Then there 
may be duties of a quasi-judicial character imposed on executive officers and members of 
executive tribunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the dis-
charge of which the President cannot in a particular case properly influence or control. 
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This requirement is not an empty procedural nicety. Although 
the President may remove an officer for a particularly offensive deci-
sion, he obviously cannot use the removal power to exert control 
over all administrative rulemaking. The threat of removal, of 
course, gives the President great influence, but the decision that 
prompted the removal remains unaltered, and perhaps unalterable, 71 
until a new appointee reverses the offensive action.72 After-the-fact 
removal, moreover, gives Congress notice of the dispute and an op-
portunity to clarify its intent on the matter or to refuse to confirm a 
new nominee to an advice and consent position. Limiting the Presi-
dent to after-the-fact removal thus partially prevents secret or undue 
Executive influence in an area committed to a particular 
subordinate's discretion. 
Reliance on Myers is misplaced for a second reason as well: 
More recent cases have greatly limited the removal power that the 
Court once recognized. Distinguishing between purely executive of-
ficials such as the postmaster in Myers and officials who, while titu-
larly within the executive branch, perform quasi-judicial or quasi-
legislative functions, the Court has held that the President may not 
remove the latter type of official without cause. In Humphrey's Exec-
utor v. United States, 13 the President had removed a member of the 
Federal Trade Commission without cause despite a statutory provi-
sion that precluded removal except for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, 
or malfeasance in office." In rejecting the idea of an illimitable pres-
idential removal power, the Court emphasized the distinction be-
tween officials who performed purely executive tasks and those who 
carried out rulemaking and adjudication. "[A]n administrative body 
created by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies," the 
Court declared, "cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an 
arm or eye of the executive."74 
The most recent removal case, Wiener v. United States,15 reiter-
But even in such a case he may consider the decision after its rendition as a reason for 
removing the officer, on the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer 
by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised. 
272 U.S. at 135. 
71. Due process, for example, may prevent the withdrawal of a property right granted. 
72. The difficulties that may be encountered, and the occasional inefficacy of the use of the 
removal power to alter the course of discretionary decision-making, was dramatized in the 
aftermath of the Saturday Night Massacre. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C, 
1973) (holding that Acting Attorney General Bork had illegally dismissed the Watergate 
prosecutor). 
73. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
74. 295 U.S. at 628. 
75. 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
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ated the Humphrey's Court's distinction between purely executive 
and other types of administrative officials. The Wiener Court held 
that the President lacked the authority to remove a member of the 
War Claims Commission even though the Commission's founding 
statute had no removal provision. Because the official performed ad-
judicative tasks more closely allied to the judicial than the executive 
power, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to deny the Presi-
dent the power of removal. Humphrey's and Wiener thus teach that 
the scope of presidential authority depends on the agency function 
that the President seeks to control.76 Where that function is legisla-
tive or judicial in nature, authority for presidential control cannot be 
implied from the Constitution. 
Although one must resist simplistic distinctions between execu-
tive, judicial, and legislative functions, there is a strong connection 
between legislative power and informal rulemaking. Rulemaking 
power is, of course, a preeminent feature of the modern administra-
tive agency, and the promulgation of rules has been a normal feature 
of American government since its inception. It is only during the 
present century, however, that rulemaking authority has brought 
about a shift in the center of gravity of lawmaking. Due to the in-
creasing complexity of modern society, Congress now lacks the ca-
pacity to enact all of the legislation that it regards as desirable. The 
number and size of the problems requiring regulatory attention, to-
gether with the constraints on congressional decision-making, in-
creasingly demand that legislative tasks be delegated to 
administrative agencies. It was originally thought that the agencies 
would merely work out the technical details of broad policies estab-
lished by Congress. Yet today, administrative legislation dwarfs the 
primary legislation of Congress, and the vastness of the delegations 
now required have blurred the line between principle and detail.77 
The legislative mandate of the agencies is often a skeleton; conse-
quently, they must author the broad regulatory policies characteristic 
of statutory law. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Supreme Court has 
76. At least one commentator has raised the question whether the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), ''that Congress may authorize the Attorney 
General to establish limitations on the President's power, ••• implicitly ..• overrule[s Wie-
ner]." Mishkin, Great Cases and Sofl Law: A Comment on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA 
L. REV. 76, 82-83 (1974). Mishkin doubts, however, that this part of the Nixon opinion is 
reliable. Id. 
77. The courts have upheld delegations that contain no or exceedingly general standards to 
guide the agency. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) {upholding a delegation 
without a substantive standard); NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (delegation 
authorized FCC to license radio communications "as the public convenience, interest or neces-
sity requires."). See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
52-80 (7th ed. 1979). For a criticism of the delegation doctrine, see note 84 i'!fra. 
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treated rulemaking as a legislative process for purposes of both the 
President's removal power and due process.78 In view of the essen-
tially legislative character of administrative rules,79 strong reasons 
exist for minimizing presidential control over agency rulemaking. 
To the extent that the President can control rulemaking, he has the 
unilateral ability to enact fundamental domestic policy, 80 a power 
that the Constitution entrusts to the legislature. Presidential direc-
tion of rulemaking thus undermines the values that the framers 
sought to protect by resting lawmaking power in Congress. First, 
placing lawmaking authority in the President's hands deprives law-
making of much of its participatory character. Congress can act only 
after legislation has been publicly proposed and debated. During 
the often lengthy period of consideration, interested groups can and 
do voice their views. In contrast, the presidential decision-making 
process, by institutional design, is often hidden from the public's 
view, and the sense of participation is correspondingly diminished.81 
Second, presidential control, in effect, makes it considerably eas-
ier to enact or repeal legislation. Due to the slowness and political 
fragmentation of the legislature, the framers expected that regulatory 
policies could be implemented only with great difficulty. Conferring 
legislative powers on the President frustrates the framers' expecta-
tion. Unrestrained by the procedural complications and political vi-
cissitudes of the legislature, the President can rather easily 
implement regulatory policy through executive order. The difficul-
ties accompanying congressional action facilitate this type of legisla-
tive action: Congress can prevent the implementation of the 
78. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v, Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 n.l, 542 n.16 (1978); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944); 
Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). 
79. Properly promulgated rules and regulations have the same legal effect as statutes. 
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979). Their provisions have the force oflaw and 
they are backed by the same sanctions as statutes, including, in many instances, the criminal 
sanctions designed to coerce obedience to the law. 
80. Undeniably, the President's executive responsibilities also involve lawmaking of sorts. 
In interpreting the particular terms of a statute which he must enforce, the President must 
exercise judgment that "shades" into lawmaking. Cf. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land 
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("the inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation 
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts"); P. 
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973) ("Statutory interpretation shades into 
judicial lawmaking on a spectrum."). The interpretative skills that the President must exercise 
in enforcing the law, however, fundamentally differ from the broad policy judgments that the 
FCC, for example, must make when formulating broadcasting regulations "in the public 
interest." 
81. Fleishman & Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legislation, 40 LA w 
& CoNTEMP. PROB. l, 38 (1976) (''when a President acts through an order, he avoids having to 
subject his policy to public scrutiny and debate"). 
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President's domestic policies only by enacting a statute to block the 
action. And the President can render his action even more secure by 
using his veto power. Ironically, a two-thirds majority vote is 
needed to overturn rather than undertake such legislative action. 82 
As a result, the continuity of domestic policy that the framers must 
have desired is disturbed. Using his power to control rulemaking, 
each successive President could discard disagreeable policies or im-
plement new ones. Perhaps more importantly, the ease of legislative 
action through presidential control of rulemaking would thwart the 
framers' desire to limit governmental power. 
Third, there is no assurance that policies enacted via executive 
order will be accompanied by a sufficiently broad popular consensus. 
It is a matter of political reality that an elected candidate does not 
represent the views of his constituency on every issue. Voters often 
elect a candidate because they support his position on issues that 
they consider fundamental, and they may disagree with many of his 
other stances. If permitted to legislate by executive order, the Presi-
dent can enact his less popular policies with a simple stroke of his 
pen. In contrast, a congressman encounters greater difficulty be-
cause, unlike the President, he must persuade a majority of Congress 
to accept his views. There is thus a much greater guarantee that leg-
islation passed by Congress has the wide popular support that the 
framers desired. Ironically, presidential control of the substantive 
products of the administrative process, a measure sometimes urged 
to improve the accountability of the administrative process,83 actu-
82. One commentator has observed that congressional control of presidential policy-
making is likely to be ineffectual for two reasons: 
First, Co!}g_ress cannot simply "overrule the executive" when it objects to the execu-
tive's interpretation of a statute. Overrule can generally be-accomplished only by means 
of repeal or amendment of the statute in question, and this is subject to a (likely) presiden-
tial veto; thus a super-majority of two-thirds of each house would be needed to rein in 
expansive executive policy-making. In fact, shortly after President Ford imposed the oil 
import fees, Congress did pass a bill suspending the fees, but the President vetoed it. 
Second, when Congress is faced with an executive policy that is in place and function-
ing, Congress often acquiesces in the executive's action for reasons which have nothing to 
do with the majority's preferences on the policy issues involved. In such a situation, Con-
gress may not want to embarrass the President; or Congress may want to score political 
points by attacking the executive's action rather than accepting political responsibility for 
some action itself; or Congresspersons may be busy running for reelection or tending to 
constituents' individual problems; or Congress may be lazy and prefer another recess; or 
there may just be inertia because some policy is functioning. For these reasons and 
others, congressional review of executive policy-making is sporadic, and the executive 
frequently makes policy without Congress either taking responsibility for it or repudiating 
it. The result is a system sharply skewed towards executive policy-making. 
Gewirtz, supra note 36, at 78-79. 
83. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 453-63; Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Pro-
cess, 84 YALE L.J. 1395 (1975). 
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ally reduces the voters' control over domestic policy.84 History, pre-
cedent, and policy all favor viewing rulemaking as an exclusive 
legislative function properly controlled by Congress. 
The third factor influencing whether a given presidential action 
falls within the twilight zone of concurrent authority or encroaches 
upon Congress's exclusive au~ority is the extent to which the Presi-
dent's action intrudes on a function properly reserved for the legisla-
ture. Although rulemaking, as we have seen, is essentially a 
legislative function, presidential action in this sphere is not necessar-
ily objectionable. Presidential directives improving intra-agency 
communication or access to relevant scientific information, for ex-
ample, do not seriously interfere with the legislative character of 
rulemaking. Such measures, best described as "facilitative,"85 do not 
command an agency to take certain action and do not affect an 
agency's substantive orientation; they simply allow an agency to exe-
cute better whatever it perceives to be its mandate. Procedural re-
quirements pose more difficult questions because they may or may 
not affect the substance of agency rules. Where particular procedu-
84. "[Presidential legislation] provides policy quickly and decisively. [But by] evading 
Congress, . . . it sacrifices accountability and consent. In short, it replaces government by law 
with rule by orders." Fleishman & Aufses, supra note 81, at 40. See Scher, Condi/Ions for 
Legislative Control, 25 J. PoL. 526 (1963) ("Democratic ideology requires control of adminis-
trative action by elected representatives of the people."). One cannot deny the validity of the 
concerns expressed by advocates of increased presidential supervision of agency policy-
making. Administrative policy-making is now largely unaccountable to either Congress or the 
President. Due to the broad delegations of lawmaking power upheld by the courts and the 
sporadic quality of congressional oversight, see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 847-48 (2d ed. 1980), Congress has failed to perform its constitu-
tionally assigned task of legislating basic policy. Presidential control over agency rulemaking, 
however, is an improper response to a very real problem. Presidential policy-making control 
distorts rather than ensures adherence to constitutional values. A better response to the ac-
countability problem is to revive the delegation doctrine so that delegations of lawmaking 
power will be accompanied by meaningful standards. By requiring Congress to make basic 
policy decisions, a stricter delegation doctrine achieves accountability but not at the expense of 
transferring enormous amounts of legislative power to the President. This approach draws 
support from Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum, 448 U.S. 607 (1980). In that 
case, a majority of the Court intimated that it would be willing to employ the delegation doc-
trine to invalidate "'sweeping delegation[s] of legislative power' .... " 448 U.S. at 646 (plu-
rality opinion) (citations omitted); 448 U.S. at 674-76, 685-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
Commentators have also called for a revivification of the delegation doctrine. See, e.g., 
Wright, Beyond JJiscretionary Justice, Bl YALE L.J. 575 (1972). Under a revived delegation 
doctrine, one wonders whether the Order's cost-benefit injunction, if ratified by Congress, 
could withstand scrutiny. The ambiguity of cost-benefit analysis raises serious questions con-
cerning the intelligibility of the delegated standard. 
85. Directives of this sort should be distinguished from procedural or substantive direc-
tives. In contrast to substantive measures, facilitative measures are not intended to affect the 
agencies' policy orientation. Unlike procedural directives, facilitative directives do not require 
the agency to change its decision-making process. Facilitative measures create opportunities 
rather than impose mandatory procedures. 
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ral requirements have a substantive effect, however, they clearly in-
trude on the legislative character of rulemaking. 
Executive Order 12,291 sets up a framework for management of 
the administrative rulemaking process that is unprecedented in scope 
and substance. The Order establishes conception-to-grave oversight 
of the rulemaking of all covered agencies, and concentrates effective 
operational authority in one agency, the 0MB. This coordinating 
agency is vested with the power to define and implement a uniform 
methodology and system of standards by which all important regula-
tory action is to be judged. The substantive impact of this single 
standard of assessment is apparent. The Order declares that 
"[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the potential ben-
efits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to soci-
ety,"86 and that "[r]egulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize 
the net benefits to society."87 It thus fails to recognize that Congress, 
in creating administrative agencies, has itself weighed certain costs 
and benefits and established general policy goals. Implicit in the no-
tion of an agency's statutory mandate or mission is a congressional 
instruction to attribute special weight to particular concerns. 88 Exec-
utive Order 12,291, however, in effect commands agencies to under-
take a de novo balancing of factors that Congress has already 
considered. 
The so-called cotton-dust case, American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, Inc. v. JJonovan,89 nicely demonstrates this point. In that 
case, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
had promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cot-
ton dust. The textile industry challenged the regulation, essentially 
claiming that OSHA was required to find that the benefits of the 
standard outweighed its costs. In rejecting the industry's argument, 
the Supreme Court held that Congress had instructed OSHA to use a 
feasibility, not a cost-benefit, standard when drafting its rules.90 The 
cotton-dust case vividly illustrates that the cost-benefit principle, like 
a principle requiring special concern for worker safety, affects the 
substance of agency rulemaking. Executive Order 12,291 gives the 
President power to shape substantive domestic policies and thus con-
86. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
87. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 2(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). 
88. See Sagolf, Economic 77zeory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1396-97, 
1419 n.lll (1981). 
89. IOI S. Ct. 2478 (1981). 
90. IOI S. Ct. at 2490. 
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stitutes a significant intrusion on an area properly entrusted to 
Congress. 
The Justice Department memorandum supporting the Order 
concedes that it imposes both procedural and substantive require-
ments, but contends that these requirements do not unlawfully dis-
place congressional or agency authority. The memorandum 
identifies the Regulatory Impact Analysis requirement as a procedu-
ral requirement, ''which . . . is at most an indirect constraint on the 
exercise of statutory discretion."91 The Justice Department catego-
rizes the requirement that agencies exercise their discretion in ac-
cordance with ''the principles of cost-benefit analysis" as substantive 
in nature,92 but argues that the Order does not conflict with statutes 
that explicitly preclude decisions based on cost-benefit assessments 
since it recognizes an exception where adherence to its requirements 
is precluded by law.93 Finally, the memorandum finds that the func-
tions of the 0MB and the Task Force are supervisory only; the tasks 
delegated to those bodies do not suggest authority to reject an 
agency's ultimate judgment. 
This attempt to justify the Order is unpersuasive. The Justice 
Department treats two specific requirements of the Order and the 
general supervisory functions devolved on the 0MB and the Task 
Force as isolated aspects of the displacement of discretion issue. The 
Order, however, is a complex, interrelated series of prescriptions and 
functions that, taken as a whole, establishes an integrated system of 
management for a substantial portion of the Executive Branch's 
rulemaking activities. Thus, the requirement that an agency prepare 
a Regulatory Impact Analysis assessing the costs and benefits of ma-
jor rules, standing alone, may be properly characterized as procedu-
ral. That requirement is relatively innocuous legally until it is seen 
as part of a mandatory assessment process that evaluates rules for 
their consistency with ''the principles of cost-benefit analysis." Even 
then, the conclusion that sufficient discretion is left with executive 
officials is plausible since it may be conceded that there is no single 
set of cost-benefit principles applicable to all situations.94 But these 
91. Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 5. 
92. Id 
93. Id at 6. Where a statute is silent, however, an agency decision-maker is free to con-
sider such factors and the President is within his supervisory authority to see that the decision-
maker considers it. As it is the agency head, and not the President, who makes the calculation 
under the Order, that officer retains considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory 
action should be taken. Id 
94. q: STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON IN• 
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D Sess., CosT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WON-
DER TOOL OR MIRAGE? (Comm. Print 1980) (describing shortcomings of cost-benefit analysis 
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two requirements do not stand alone. In the context of the unf et-
tered authority that the 0MB may wield under the Order,95 the inev-
itable effect of the application of these substantive principles could 
be the displacement of ultimate agency discretion in contravention 
of any statute vesting discretionary rulemaking authority in an 
agency official. Executive Order 12,291 prescribes exactly how 
agency decisions are to be- made: Legitimate agency action can oc-
cur only where the potential benefits exceed the potential costs. The 
Order's declaration that it applies only to the extent permitted by law 
does not alter its substantive character. This exception permits an 
agency to forgo cost-benefit analysis only if its underlying statute 
explicitly forbids such balancing. Yet where, due to the ambiguity of 
the congressional· delegation or some other reason, the applicable 
statute does not direct an agency to use a particular methodology, 
adherence to the Order will undoubtedly shape the substance of 
agency regulations. In such cases, the Order's cost-benefit principle 
directs an agency to consider a broad range of factors and, more 
important, determines how the agency should value each factor. The 
Order thus limits the permissible range of agency action and, by en-
joining agencies to maximize net benefits, implies that there is one 
"right" response in each rulemaking situation. Agencies, of course, 
in certain situations). Cost-benefit analysis has also been criticized as biased against regulation 
because it systematically understates the value of benefits that are not amenable to numerical 
quantification. Douglas Costle, the EPA Administrator during the Carter administration, 
explained: 
A third difficulty in benefit measurement is the most difficult of all: translating certain 
kinds of physical benefits, such as reduced sickness or the prevention of premature death, 
into dollar terms. In other words, what is the economic value of a longer and healthier 
life? 
Because of these analytical problems, health effects and their economic valuation re-
main speculative. We cannot pin them down ... and in the meantime, business and 
government officials can point to the dollar-costs of controls that federal regulation re-
quires. The upshot is that, while our critics consistently appear no-nonsense fellows with 
their feet on the ground, environmental regulators come across as a bunch of bureaucratic 
flower-children intent on recreating the Garden of Eden. 
Costle, Stop J)emagogue,y on Cost-Benefit Analysis, LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Apr. 9, 1979, at 
32. 
95. The rulemaking authority vested in the Director of the 0MB allows him to "[p]repare 
and promulgate uniform standards for . . . the development of Regulatory Impact Analyses." 
Exec. Order 12,291 § 6(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (1981). Thus, whether such stan-
dards are government-wide or individually tailored to an agency, agency-head discretion is 
diminished in a degree not accounted for in the memoi:andum's conclusion that "[t]he agency 
would thus retain considerable latitude in determining whether regulatory action is justified 
and what form such action should take," Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 6, since "the princi-
ples of cost-benefit analysis" may be selected for the agency requiring little more than simply 
ministerial application. Finally, § 2(b) of the Order appears to enjoin all subject agencies to 
take no "[r)egulatory action ... unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation out-
weigh the potential costs to society." Initial implementation of this directive, of course, falls to 
the Director. In the face of this directive, will the Director, after developing cost-benefit prin-
ciples, fail to attempt to ensure their proper application to the fullest extent of his authority? 
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retain some discretion in the application of the notoriously ambigu-
ous cost-benefit methodology.96 But even this residual discretion is 
limited since the Order authorizes the Director of the 0MB to pro-
mulgate a uniform methodology for cost-benefit analyses.97 More-
over, the Order also creates a formal "review" mechanism through 
which the White House can market its views concerning the agen-
cies' applications of the cost-benefit principles.98 By requiring most 
agencies to use a uniform cost-benefit methodology and subjecting 
their application of that methodology to correction, albeit formally 
unenforced, by the White House, the Order substantially interferes 
with agencies' discretion and directly affects the substance of admin-
istrative policy-making. One might hope that Congress will more 
explicitly specify the factors that agencies must consider and the 
weight that they must attribute to those factors. The proper response 
to this concern, however, is to require that Congress delegate power 
according to definite standards, not to shift policy-making authority 
to the President wherever those standards are indefinite.99 
Comparing Executive Order 12,291 to recent presidential initia-
tives in the area highlights the degree of the Order's intrusion on 
agency discretion and Congress's domestic policy-making function. 
Like President Reagan, recent presidents have sought to direct agen-
cies' attention to factors beyond their narrow statutory purview. 100 
96. See note 94 supra. 
97. Exec. Order 12,291 § 6(a)(2), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (1981). 
98. The Justice Department's suggestion that agency discretion is somehow preserved be-
cause the Order contains no sanctions for either disregarding the views of the White House or 
failing to comply with the order's requirements, Simms Memo, supra note 66, at 6-7, must be 
rejected. The presumption must be made that the agency will heed the Order's requirements 
- it has the force of law - and be influenced by the views of the White House. Otherwise, 
the Order is pointless. This adherence to the views of the White House will prove particularly 
troublesome if, as Representative Waxman suspects, the Administration uses "cost-benefit 
analysis to reach decisions that will favor business and industry in this country rather than the 
public." N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 3. In that event, cost-benefit analysis "will be a 
political tool rather than a regulatory tool." Id 
99. See note 85 supra. 
100. During the Nixon Administration, for example, the 0MB instituted a system of Qual-
ity of Life Review. Although it was theoretically applicable to all agencies with jurisdiction 
over environmental quality, consumer protection, and occupational and public health and 
safety, review focused almost exclusively on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regula-
tions. See generally J. QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA 117-42 (1976). 
Quality of Life r.rocedures required all EPA regulations to be processed through an inter-. 
agency review both before such regulations were issued as proposals for public comment and 
again before the regulations were promulgated in final form. The 0MB coordinated the re-
view which involved the circulation of draft regulations to all interested departments and 
agencies and an allowance of time, often four weeks or more, for the preparation of comments, 
followed by meetings at the staff level to resolve any questions raised. The 0MB controlled 
the decision whether or not to require additional time for completion of agency review or to 
hold additional meetings to resolve disputes. The Department of Commerce was apparently a 
frequent and hostile participant, often reflecting indirectly the opposition to proposed EPA 
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President Ford's Executive Order 11,821,101 for example, required all 
executive agencies to assess the inflationary impact of proposed reg-
ulations.102 President Carter issued an order of even broader scope. 
His Executive Order 12,044103 required that agencies address the an-
ticipated economic impact of certain rules and detail available alter-
natives.104 Neither of these earlier orders, it should be noted, 
rules. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 464. If there was dissatisfaction with the EP A's resolution of 
disputed issues, further meetings, presided over by 0MB officials and often attended by White 
House staff, were called to resolve the conflicts. Id at 464-65. It is estimated that it took at 
least two years for significant environmental regulations to be finalized. See Executive Branch 
Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Regula-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 60-76 (1979) 
(statement of John Quarles) [hereinafter cited as Quarles testimony). 
Quality of Life Review was highly controversial throughout its existence. Proponents con-
tended that any delay in the rulemaking process was justified by the improved quality of both 
the regulations and the supporting analyses produced by the agency to justify its proposals. 
These improvements were directly attributed to the searching comments and critiques of sister 
agencies. Bruff, supra note 26, at 465. Critics contended that the review unnecessarily ex-
tended the rulemaking process and allowed many important comments and discussions to oc-
cur off the public record, thereby depriving the system of the full benefits of public debate. 
Furthermore, it was contended that the system in actuality often resulted in behind the scenes 
resolutions to accommodate objections of other agencies. This, assertedly, was contrary to the 
statutory assignment of ultimate decision-making authority to the Administrator of the EPA 
and distorted the public perception of the locus of that final authority. See Quarles Testimony, 
supra, at 63-66; Office of Management and Budget Plays Critical Part in Environmental Poli-
cymaking, Faces Little External Review, 1 ENVIR. REP. (BNA), Sept. 3, 1976, at 693, 694-97. 
Quality of Life Review was ended on January 25, 1977, by the Acting Administrator of the 
EPA. There was no reported court challenge to the validity of the review system. 
101. 3 C.F.R. 926 (1971-1975 Comp.), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 1904 app., at 592 (1976), 
extended to December 31, 1977, by Exec. Order No. 11,949, 3 C.F.R. 161 (1977), reprinted In 
12 U.S.C. § 1904 app., at 592 (1976). 
102. The impact statements prepared under this directive were reviewed by the President's 
Council on Wage and Price Stability, but that body had no power to mandate changes in the 
rules. There is some indication that the Order stimulated improvement in the economic analy-
sis of some affected agencies and may have influenced some agency decisions. See AMERICAN 
BAR AssocJATION, COMMISSION ON LAW AND ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION 85 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as ABA "STUDY]; Note, The I'!flatlon Impact Statement Program.· An Assess-
ment of the First Two Years, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 1138, 1160-62 (1977). 
103. 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 553 app., at 107 (Supp. III 1979). 
104. The Order attempted to ensure more meaningful public participation in informal 
rulemaking by setting a minimum 60-day comment period in certain cases. It also provided 
for review of "significant" proposed rules by the promulgating agency. Under certain circum-
stances, agencies were required to analyze the anticipated impact of a proposed rule and to 
detail their consideration of the available alternative approaches. The agencies themselves 
determined whether a rule was significant and developed the procedures for preparing regula-
tory analyses. They were also required to prepare semi-annual agendas of forthcoming 
rulemaking proceedings. Oversight of the performance of the agencies was lodged in three 
institutional entities: the Regulatory Council, the Council on Wage and Price Stability 
(COWPS), and the Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG). The Regulatory Council, 
which consisted of the heads of all executive departments and agencies and those independent 
regulatory agency heads who desired to participate, played two roles. It collected information 
from agencies about major pending and proposed rules and published it semiannually in the 
Regulatory Calendar. It also served as a prescreening body for proposed rules, allowing agen-
cies to coordinate rulemaking to avoid duplication of effort or contradictions of policy. 
RARG, composed of representatives from all economic and regulatory agencies, chaired by 
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and staffed by individuals from COWPS, 
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interfered with the agencies' discretion to decide how to balance the 
additional information that they were required to generate. Presi-
dent Reagan's order stands alone in commanding that cost-benefit 
principles, rather than an agency's perception of its statutory mis-
sion, should guide administrative policy-making. 
Executive Order 12,291 is also more intrusive than the presiden-
tial intervention in informal rulemaking recently sanctioned by the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals. In Sierra Club v. 
Costle, 105 the D.C. Circuit upheld the legitimacy of discussions be-
tween the President and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) during the postcomment period of informal rulemaking. The 
Court rejected statutory and due process challenges to the oral con-
tacts, stating: 
Our form of government simply could not function effectively or ra-
tionally if key executive policymakers were isolated from each other 
and from the Chief Executive. Single mission agencies do not always 
have the answers to complex regulatory problems. An overworked ad-
ministrator exposed on a 24-hour basis to a dedicated but zealous staff 
needs to know the arguments and ideas of policymakers in other agen-
cies as well as in the White House. 106 
Although the Court did not expressly address the separation of pow-
ers issue, the oral contacts present in Sierra Club can, for separation 
of powers purposes, be distinguished from the presidential interven-
tion contemplated by Executive Order 12,291. In Sierra Club, the 
EPA apparently retained discretion to decide what weight, if any, to 
accord President Carter's policy suggestions. Executive Order 
12,291, in contrast, is a presidential command regarding the method 
of decision that agencies must use. In addition to creating a formal-
ized mechanism through which the President's policies can be com-
municated and, to some extent, enforced, the Order permits the 
President, through the Director of the 0MB, to comment on how the 
agency makes its decision. While the Sierra Club communications 
had the task of selecting from 10 to 20 of the agencies' regulatory analyses for independent 
review and comment. The comments were to be filed during the public comment period of the 
rulemaking and made part of the record. But, as with the Ford Order, Executive Order 12,044 
vested no formal enforcement authority in any governmental body outside of the subject agen-
cies. It also provided no central standard setting and performance evaluation mechanism by 
which to judge the efficacy of the regulatory analyses that the agencies were required to per-
form. The Order depended entirely on hortatory means for achieving compliance, a task made 
most difficult by the presence of the subject agency on the interagency groups. 
For a critique of the Carter Order program, see DeMuth, Cons/raining Regulatory Costs: 
Part I, The While House Programs, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1980, at 13-26; lJeregulalion HQ: 
An Interview with Murray L Weidenhaum and James C Miller III, supra note 9, at 14-16. 
105. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
106. 657 F.2d at 406. 
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substantially preserved the agency's policy-making discretion, Exec-
utive Order 12,291 largely displaces that discretion. 
Recent legislation proposed in Congress provides a final illustra-
tion of the Order's interference with the prerogatives of the legisla-
ture. A number of proposed amendments to the APA have recently 
been circulated in Congress. Several of these proposals deserve spe-
cial mention. One bill, championed by Senator Lloyd Bentsen and 
Representative Clarence Brown, parallels President Reagan's order 
and requires that federal agencies proposing regulation select the 
most cost-effective method of meeting regulatory objectives.107 A 
second bill, unanimously reported out of Senate Committee in 1980, 
explicitly rejects a cost-benefit requirement as "both unworkable and 
undesirable."108 The Senate Report states: · 
This Committee recognizes the inadequacy of any strict cost/benefit 
analysis. The goal of regulatory reform is not the elimination of regu-
lation, nor is it intended to slow regulation to a halt by requiring agen-
cies to justify their regulations through unrealistic and cumbersome 
cost/benefit requirements. Rather, it is an effort to develop a mecha-
nism for developing economically feasible methods of regulation con-
sistent with important societal goals.1°9 
The Senate Report and the two competing bills highlight the danger 
that the President, by acting in an area of congressional controversy, 
will reach a different result than the one that Congress would other-
wise adopt. 110 In fact, even the Bentsen-Brown bill differs from 
President Reagan's order. The bill does not direct agencies to calcu-
107. H.R. 75, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
108. Reform of Federal Regulation Act, S.262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). 
109. S. REP. No. 96-4018, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 2 at 20 (1980). The value of cost-benefit 
analysis has been hotly debated. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 7, col. 1. A House subcom-
mittee has extensively considered the merits of cost-benefit analysis. While not condemning 
all uses of this tool, the subcommittee's conclusion summarizes the state of the art: 
Proponents of the use of cost-benefit analysis suggest that by adding up all the projected 
costs and the projected benefits of a giyen regulation, we can-determine whether a pro-
posed regulation is worth implementing. However, this report has documented numerous 
theoretical and practical shortcomings in trying to do a cost-benefit analysis. Even if all 
analysts were brilliant and public-spirited, it would be impossible to do a cost-benefit 
analysis that would accurately predict the effects of a given proposal. Moreover, such 
analyses do not deal with the equity factor, that the costs and benefits of a given regula-
tion often accrue to different people. In short, the Subcommittee believes that all available 
evidence suggests that formal cost-benefit analysis is simply too primitive a tool to make a 
decisive factor in rulemaking. 
SUBCOMM, ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND 
FOREIGN COMMERCE, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL. OR MIRAGE? 32 (Comm. 
Print 1980). 
110. The Regulatory Reform Act, the bill now pending in the Senate, contains cost-benefit 
provisions similar to those in Executive Order 12,291 - a fact undoubtedly due in part to the 
issuance of the Order. The bill requires that rulemaking agencies determine "that the benefits 
of the rule justify the costs of the rule, and that the rule will substantially achieve the rule 
making objectives in a more cost-effective manner than the alternatives described in the rule 
making." S. 1080, § 621(d)(2), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). An amendment to S. 1080 intro-
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late benefits because, in the words of Representative Brown, "Con-
gress generally presumes or sets a level of benefits to be achieved"; 111 
the bill merely enjoins agencies to use the lowest cost method of at-
taining presumed benefits.112 In any case, it is highly inappropriate 
for the President, by executive fiat, to attempt to resolve this impor-
tant legislative debate. That President Reagan has done so demon-
strates the significance of his intrusion on the legislative domain. 
All three factors reviewed above - the institutional competence 
of the President, the proper roles of the legislature and the Chief 
Executive, and the degree of the Order's intrusion on the role of the 
legislature - argue against according the President unilateral au-
thority to enact Executive Order 12,291. Casting the argument in 
Justice Jackson's language, strong reasons exist for viewing the Or-
der as within Congress's exclusive domain; the Order may thus be 
sustained only if an express or implied congressional delegation of 
authority may be discerned. 
duced by Senator Laxalt includes identical language. Amendment No. 640 to S. 1080, 
§ 622(d)(2)(B), 127 CONG. REC. Sl4,132 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1981). 
This cost-benefit provision is less constricting than§ 2 of Executive Order 12,291. Unlike 
the Order, the Senate bill requires neither that benefits exceed costs nor that net benefits be 
maximal. 
At least one regulatory reform bill now before the House contains a cost-benefit provision 
that is even more flexible than the Senate version. The House bill, sponsored by Representa-
tive Danielson, requires that an agency explain "how the benefits of the rule bear a reasonable 
relationship to the costs and other effects of the rule," and ''why the rule attains its objectives, 
in a manner consistent with applicable statutes, with less adverse economic effects than other 
alternatives considered .... " Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 746, 
§ 622(c)(5)(6A), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
Although both bills would give oversight authority to the President, they place greater 
limits on that authority than does Executive Order 12,291. First, in contrast to the Order, 
neither bill permits the President or his staff to delay indefinitely promulgation of proposed or 
final rules. The Senate bill stipulates that if Presidential review of agency regulatory analysis 
is established, "such reviews must be concluded within one hundred and twenty days following 
the receipt of the relevant draft rules and analyses." S. 1080, § 624(a)(l), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1981). The House proposal states that all compliance procedures established by the director 
of the 0MB "shall be consistent with the prompt completion ofrulemaking proceedings ..•. " 
Amendment in the Nature of Substitute to H.R. 746, § 624(a), 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), 
Second, both bills provide for public comment before executive oversight procedures are 
adopted. Third, the Senate bill declares that "Any exercise of authority by the President con-
cerning proposed or final major rules or associated regulatory analyses of an independent reg-
ulatory agency pursuant to subsection (1) shall he limited to nonhinding advisory 
recommendations." S. 1080, § 624(a)(2), 97th Cong., l!it_Sess. (1981) (emphasis added). 
The final form of the regulatory reform legislation or even whether Congress will enact any 
new legislation cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, it appears that, in addition to differing sub-
stantially from the APA (the most recent comprehensive legislation regarding informal 
rulemaking), see notes 140-64 infta and accompanying text, Executive Order 12,291 also differs 
from any new legislation that Congress is likely to approve. 
111. Brown, A More .Demanding Standard· The Brown-Bentsen Bills, REGULATION, 
May/June 1979, at 20, 22. 
112. See id 
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B. Has Congress Delegated Authority? 
In the absence of express or implied constitutional authority, sup-
port for Executive Order 12,291 must be found in a congressional 
grant of authority. Since Congress has made no directly applicable 
statutory grant, that authority must be implied from relevant legisla-
tion or congressional practice. In view of Executive Order 12,29l's 
substantive ramifications, the need to maintain the constitutional 
separation of powers demands that the implication be clear, convinc-
ing, and unmistakable. Congress has nowhere stated the role that 
the President should play in the control of informal rulemaking, but 
its intent can be inf erred from several sources, the most prominent of 
which include the President's budgetary and reorganizational pow-
ers, use of the legislative veto over certain agency rules, and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Rather than establishing the requisite 
authorization for the Order, these sources convincingly demonstrate 
Congress's intention to exclude the President from a policy-making 
role in the administrative process. 
1. Presidential Budgetary and Reorganizational Powers 
Since early in this century, the President, with Congress's bless-
ing, has wielded a great deal of authority over the agency budget 
process. Through his budget office, the President has been author-
ized to present a unified annual budget on behalf of federal agencies, 
clear agency information requests, and even decide which legislative 
proposals urged by the agencies should receive congressional atten-
tion. The scope of the control over administrative policy-making 
that these powers confer has fluctuated over the years. 
Presidential authority in the agency budget process began with 
the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,113 which 
allowed the President to formulate a national budget with the assist-
ance of a newly created Bureau of the Budget (BOB). Previously, 
each agency had submitted its annual budget request directly to 
Congress. Finding this process inefficient and unwieldy, Congress 
created the BOB to review the morass of agency budgetary informa-
tion and to approve agency budget requests. 114 By 1970, _the_J3DJ3 
possessed an impressive array of legal authorities for supervision of 
113. Ch. 18, 42 Stat. 20 (1921) (codified throughout 31 U.S.C.). The Office of Management 
and Budget was created by Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1070 (1966-1970 
Compilation), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 16 app., at 1197 (1976) and in 84 Stat. 2085 (1970). 
114. See generally L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER, ch. l (1975). 
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nearly all departments and agencies. 115 In addition to reviewing and 
approving agency budget requests, the Bureau was authorized to 
study agency organization, to clear agency proposals for legislation 
or agency comments on proposed legislation,116 and to control agen-
cies' requests for information.• •1 
In granting these powers to the President, Congress intended -
at least in part - that he would play a policy-neutral role; the Presi-
dent was to coordinate the vast tangle of administrative agencies. 
Through his authority to study agency organization and review 
budget requests, the President could identify overlapping efforts, 
eliminate needless duplication, and resolve interagency conflicts. 
One must recognize, however, that the powers that enabled the Pres-
ident to carry out his managerial responsibilities also gave him the 
capacity to influence administrative policy. In the threat of budget 
reductions, the President possesses a powerful tool that he can use to 
enforce his own policy designs. The President could, moreover, use 
his clearance powers to focus congressional attention on agency pro-
posals or comments agreeable to him. Yet the BOB, notwithstanding 
its significant policy-influencing potential, maintained an image of 
bipartisan neutrality, and its Director was seen as a personal techni-
cal adviser on fiscal and organizational matters. 118 Although, in 
principle, the President has long been able to influence substantively 
the policies formulated by administrative agencies, until recently the 
power was relatively dormant. 
In 1970, however, President Nixon reconstituted the BOB as the 
OMB119 and sought to expand its role.120 Departing from the history 
115. Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, tit. II, 53 Stat. 565 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 2 
(1976)). 
116. See President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, 6 
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 353 (Mar. 16, 1970), reprinted in 31 u.s.c. § 16 app., at 1198 
(1976). The requirement oflegislative clearance does not appear to be legislatively based but 
has been an accepted practice since 1937. See Bureau of Budget Circular No. 344 (Nov. 15, 
1937). The present version of this policy appears in 0MB Circular No. A-19 (Sept. 20, 1979). 
117. Federal Reports Act of 1942, ch. 811, 56 Stat. 1078 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3511 (1976)). 
118. Indeed, the Director was not even subject to Senate confirmation. SENATE COMM. ON 
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, REOU• 
LATORY ORGANIZATION 43 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL REGULATION 
STUDY). . 
119. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1070 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted 
in 31 U.S.C. § 16 app., at 1197 (1976), and in 84 Stat. 2085. 
120. The OMB's ostensible purpose was to take a more active role in the evaluation of 
program performance and to judge the overall effectiveness of the programs from a central 
perspective. President's Message to Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1970, 6 
WEEKLY CoMP. OF PRES. Doc. 353 (Mar. 16, 1970), reprinted in 31 u.s.c. § 16 app., at 1198 
(1976). 
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of policy-neutrality, President Nixon began to use the 0MB, to-
gether with his self-proclaimed impoundm.ent powers, to alter or end 
established programs.121 As the 0MB began to be viewed as a polit-
ical instrument of the President, 122 Congress's response to President 
Nixon's unprecedented efforts was far-reaching; the legislature se-
verely limited the OMB's autonomy and forcefully asserted its own 
desire to control administrative policy-making. For the first time, 
Congress required Senate confirmation of the OMB's Director and 
Deputy Director.123 The OMB's monopoly on the processing of 
agency budget requests was ended as Congress created its own cen-
tral budget evaluator, the Congressional Budget Office (CB0). 124 
Congress has, on a selective basis, either eliminated the requirement 
that the 0MB clear agency budget requests or mandated that the 
requests be concurrently submitted to the CB0.125 Equally signifi-
121. See L. FtsHER, supra note 114, ai 147-74. 
122. FEDERAL REGULATION STUDY, supra note I 18, at 43-44. 
123. Act of Mar. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1976)). 
124. 2 u.s.c. §§ 601-604 (1976). 
125. Since 1973, Congress has mandated that the budget requests of the U.S. Postal Serv-
ice, see Act of June 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-328, § 23, 88 Stat. 287 (codified at 39 U.S.C. 
§ 2009 (1976)), and the U.S. International Trade Commission, see Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-618, § 175(a)(l), 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2232 (1976)), be submitted 
to Congress without revision, and that the budget requests and legislative proposals of other 
agencies be submitted concurrently to 0MB. See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
579, § 5(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896 (reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 522a app., at 318 (1976)) (Privacy Protec-
tion Study Commission); Commodity Future Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-463, § 10l(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 4a(h)(l)-(2) (1976)) (Commod-
ity Future Trading Commission); Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573, § 27(k), 
86 Stat. 1207 (1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2076 (k) (1976) (Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, § 304(b)(7), 88 Stat. 
2156 (1975) (codified at49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(7)(1976)) (National Transportation Safety Board); 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 202(a), 92 Stat. 1122 (codified at 5 
U.S.C. § 1205(j) (Supp. III 1979)) (Merit Systems Protections Board); Railroad Revitalization 
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 311, 90 Stat. 60 (codified at 31 
U.S.C. § l l(j) (1976)) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Department of Energy Act, Pub. L. 
No. 95-91, § 401, 91 Stat. 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(j) (Supp. III 1979)) (Federal, En-
_ergy Regulatory Commission); AMTRAK Improvement Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-146, § 12, 
87 Stat. 553 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 601(d) (1976)) (National Railroad Passenger Corporation); 
Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-236, § 2021, 87 Stat. 990 (codified at 
45 U.S.C. § 712(g) (1976)) (U.S. Railway Association) Section 111 of the Act of Oct. 28, 1974, 
exempts the following agencies from clearance oflegislative proposals and comments: Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the National Credit 
Union Administration. Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § Ill, 88 Stat. 1500 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 250 (1976)). 
Until 1973, the requirement of clearance of information-gathering requests extended to 
independent regulatory agencies. Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, tit. IV,§ 409, 87 
Stat. 593 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 3512 (1976)). Congress has since returned partial control 
over the independents to the 0MB. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 
Stat. 2819 (codified at 44 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3520 (West Supp. 1981)). 0MB may now veto 
collection requests by independent regulatory commissions but the veto may be overriden by a 
majority vote of the subject commission. See 44 U.S.C.A. & 3507(c) (West Supp. 1981). 
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cant was the enactment of the Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 1974,126 which greatly limited the President's putative author-
ity to impound agency funds and his concomitant power to shape 
policy.127 Finally, Congress countered the institutional development 
of the 0MB by enhancing the authority of its watchdog audit 
agency, the General Accounting Office, with program evaluation 
functions and a special oversight role in preventing presidential im-
poundments.128 The spate of legislation following the politicization 
of the 0MB conclusively demonstrates that Congress, rather than 
acquiescing to presidential policy-making, desired to maintain con-
trol over administrative agencies. Congress has empowered the 
President to act in the interests of coordination and organizational 
efficiency, but has carefully restrained such action, lest it assume 
substantive policy dimensions. 
Congressional limitations on the President's reorganizational 
powers reiterate the theme that the President's managerial role does 
not encompass control of administrative policy-making. Congress 
has several times delegated to the President extensive powers of gov-
ernmental reorganization. 129 The policy-making potential stemming 
from these powers was great: The President typically could transfer, 
consolidate, or abolish agency functions, including rulemaking.130 
In principle, the President could have transferred rulemaking pro-
grams from one agency to another possessing a fundamentally differ-
ent mission. Hesitant to confer power with such potential 
substantive impact, Congress has imposed several conditions on the 
President's reorganizational authority. First, all of the reorganiza-
tion acts have been of limited duration, none being effective for more 
126. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified in part at 31 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1407 (1976)). 
The Act was passed in response to President Nixon's assertion that he had inherent authority 
to impound appropriated funds. See Local 2677, American Federation of Government Em-
ployees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (D.D.C. 1973), holding that the President had no inherent 
authority to impound. All other reported cases dealt with whether the statute in question 
specifically permitted impoundment. These opinions generally held that impoundment was 
not allowed. See, e.g., Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 136 (1975); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 
501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State Highway Commn. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973). 
127. The statute severely restricts the Executive's power to impound. Although it allows 
for the possibility of deferral or rescission and short (45 days) periods when agency spending 
can be suspended, all impoundment actions are subject to a one-House veto and agency spend-
ing is under constant surveillance by the Comptroller General, who has authority to seek court 
assistance in the face of violation of the provisions of the Act. 31 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). 
128. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 1405-1406 (1976) (provision for oversight and court action by 
Comptroller General on impoundments); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1157 (1976) (program evaluation 
authority). 
129. Reorganization plans submitted by the President take effect if not vetoed by either 
House of Congress within a specified period. Reorganization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-17, 
§ 2, 91 Stat. 32 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1978)). 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). 
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than four years.131 Second, some of the acts specifically restricted 
reorganizational power. illustratively, the most recent reorganiza-
tion act, which lapsed on April 7, 1981, expressly prohibited the 
President from abolishing "any enforcement or statutory pro-
gram," 132 creating any new executive departments, or consolidating 
two or more departments. 133 Third, with two short-lived exceptions, 
all of the reorganization acts adopted since 1932 have included pro-
visions authorizing a legislative veto. 134 Each of these restrictions, 
and particularly the provisions for a legislative veto, reflect Con-
gress's intent to cabin even the potential for presidential control of 
administratively formulated policy. 
2. Congress's Use of the Legislative Veto 
Perhaps the clearest and most eagerly pursued congressional in-
dication of its desire to maintain control over administrative deci-
sion-making in general and agency rulemaking in particular is its 
acceptance and utilization of the legislative veto. 135 Congress has 
used the legislative veto not only to prevent the President from indi-
rectly controlling the substance of agency policy, but also to increase 
it~.,own control over the administrative process. Since 1932, 193 acts 
of Congress have contained 272 separate provisions giving the legis-
lature direct review powers of s~me description. Of that number, 
substantially more than half have been enacted since 1970. In 1980 
alone, Congress passed seventeen acts containing thirty-eight veto 
provisions.136 Moreover, the nature and scope of the review has 
131. The authority was allowed to lapse in April 1973 and was not revived until April 
1977. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON THE RULES OF THE 
HOUSE OF THE COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 
(Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE VETO}. 
132. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978). 
133. 5 U.S.C. § 903(a)(l) (Supp. II 1978). 
134. One exception is found in the Economy Act of 1933, ch. 212, § 403(c), 47 Stat. 1489, 
which gave President Roosevelt unfettered reorganization authority. See generally LEGISLA-
TIVE VETO, supra note 131, at 164. The other appears in the First War Powers Act of Dec. 
1941, ch. 593, tit. I, 55 Stat. 838. 
135. Briefly, a legislative veto is a statutorily authorized means by which the Congress, or a 
part ofit, such as one House, a committee, or a committee chairman, may subject proposals for 
Executive action pursuant to statute to further legislative consideration and control In its most 
controversial form, a proposal must be either reformulated or abandoned. But common to all 
varieties of the veto mechanism is the inability of the President to counter-veto a congressional 
rejection. 
136. Norton, Statistical Summary of Congressional Approval and Disapproval Legislation, 
1932-1982 (CRS, Sept. 13, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). For a compre-
hensive compilation oflegislative veto provisions see Norton, Congressional Review, Deferral, 
and Disapproval of Executive Actions: A Summary and Inventory of Statutory Authority 
(CRS, April 30, 1976) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Norton, 1976-1977 Con-
gressional Acts Authorizing Prior Review, Approval, and Disapproval of Proposed Executive 
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changed markedly. In the past, legislative veto provisions have usu-
ally been selective, directed to some or all actions encompassed by a 
particular statute or program. More recently, Congress has consid-
ered proposals with a vastly broader sweep. In May 1980, for exam-
ple, Congress subjected all trade regulation rules of the Federal 
Trade Commission to legislative scrutiny. 137 And bills that would 
apply the legislative veto to the proposed rules of all agencies have 
received serious consideration.138 Besides indicating that Congress 
desires to exercise ultimate control over administrative policy-
making, the dramatically increased reliance on the legislative veto 
signals an intention to exclude presidential action from this sphere. 
Because the veto is accomplished without presidential assent or in-
volvement, its inherent nature is antithetical to executive control of 
agency rulemaking. Indeed, some commentators have raised consti-
tutional objections against the legislative veto, claiming that it de-
prives the President of his constitutional power to veto legislation. 139 
Congress's use of the legislative veto, like its treatment of the 
Actions (CRS, May 25, 1978) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review); Norton, 1979 Acts 
Authorizing, Approval or Disapproval, or Requiring Advance Notice, of Proposed Executive 
Actions, Rules and Regulations (CRS, April 17, 1980) (copy on file with the Michigan Law 
Review). Not all legislative veto provisions are still effective. Brief for the U.S. Senate, Appel-
lee-Petitioner at Addendum I (identifying 56 statutes currently in effect that contain legislative 
veto provisions-the list, however, appears incomplete), Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice v. Chadha, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171). 
137. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, § 21, 94 
Stat. 374,393 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57a-l (Supp. IV 1980)), In the Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1207, 95 Stat. 718 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2083), similar 
review was imposed on all rules to be promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission. 
138. See, e.g., H.R. 512, H.R. 601, and H.R. 1776 (96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1979). In the 97th 
Congress, see S. 382, S. 890, H.R. 1776, and H.R. 3740 (97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1981). 
139. Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 
56 N.C. L. REV. 423 (1978); Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional 
Resolutions and Commillees, 66 HARV. L. REV. 569 (1953). These objections are based prima-
rily upon the separation of powers principle and the specific constitutional requirements that 
both Houses of Congress participate in the lawmaking process and that the President have an 
oportunity to veto the product of that process. There has as yet been no definitive judicial 
resolution of the issue. Two cases have been decided on the merits. In Atkins v. United States, 
556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978), a divided Court of Claims 
upheld the one-House veto provision of the Salary Act. In Chadha v. Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv., 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), appeal filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3865 (U.S. May 19, 1981) 
(No. 80-1832) the court struck down a one-House veto provision of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act on separation of powers grounds. 
The continuing uncertainty as to the veto's validity, combined with persistent Executive 
opposition to its application and doubts as to its practicality as a mechanism to manage and 
control administrative action on a broad scale, have raised serious. questions as to its long 
range utility. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR EsTABLISHMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES 28-
34 (Comm. Print 1980); Bruff & Gellhom, Congressional Control of Administrative Regula/Ion: 
A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1369 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and 
Control of .Delegated Power, 11 CoLUM. L. REv. 1119 (1977). 
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0MB and governmental reorganization, reveals a coherent concep-
tion of the President's role in the administrative process. Congress 
has delegated to the President tasks that it cannot effectively perform 
- coordinating the welter of administrative agencies, organizing the 
haphazardly created bureaucracy more efficiently, avoiding duplica-
tive efforts, and eliminating needless conflict. The President's au-
thorized concern for "efficiency," however, justifies ensuring that 
agencies successfully execute their tasks, not measuring agency-for-
mulated policy according to cost-benefit ratios. As the 
counterweights that Congress has developed to the 0MB and the 
President's reorganization powers demonstrate, Congress has denied 
the President leeway to shape administrative policy-making in any 
direct and significant way. The legislative veto, a device that ex-
cludes presidential participation entirely, signifies Congress's judg-
ment that it alone should shape the course of domestic policy. 
3. The Administrative Procedure Act 
In addition to the sources discussed above, the Adminstrative 
Procedure Act140 (APA) supports an argument that Executive Order 
12,291 contradicts the will of Congress. The first part of this two-
part argument builds on the theme already developed, concluding 
that, like the other available indicators of legislative intent, the Act 
denies the President authority to control the substance of administra-
tive policy-making. Although the Act is silent on the permissibility 
of presidential intervention, the evidence suggests that Congress ob-
jected to a formalized presidential presence in rulemaking, especially 
where the possibility of substantive policy influence exists. Both 
before and after passage of the Act, Congress considered proposals 
that, like Executive Order 12,291, concentrated authority to evaluate 
agency performance in a central oversight body. The 1941 Report of 
the Attorney General's Committee ·on :Adrnroistrative Procedure, 141 
the source of many of the Act's provisions, recommended the crea-
tion of an Office of Federal Administrative Procedure. Sitting atop 
the bureaucratic maze, this superagency was ''to study and coordi-
nate administrative procedures, and in general through continuing 
studies and periodical recommendations, to achieve and stimulate 
practical improvements in a manner not possible through omnibus 
legislation."142 Although the Office apparently would have had no 
140. 5 u.s.c. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976). 
141. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL RE-
PORT (1941) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT]. 
142. Id at 6. 
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power to promulgate and enforce a uniform methodology by which 
agencies would review proposed rules, the Committee's Report con-
templated that the Office would be authorized to oversee the entire 
agency decision-making process and to require additional proce-
dures, some of the powers now claimed by President Reagan. The 
proposal for an Office with centralized oversight power was rejected 
in the Senate, apparently because of fear that "such an office . . . 
will be political, will interfere with the independent operation of 
boards and commissions, [and] will constitute a superadministrative 
agency." 143 The fear that the Office would unduly politicize the 
agency decision-making process applies a fortiori to an oversight 
mechanism that, in addition to imposing new procedures, seeks to 
enforce an outcome-influencing methodology. 
Two other proposals also deserve mention. First, the Brownlow 
Report,144 a 1936 study that served as a springboard for congres-
sional discussion of the Act, 145 recommended that the executive 
branch be reorganized to create an integrated, hierarchical structure 
over which the President would preside as an active manager. 146 In 
particular, the Report urged that the President's role be expanded by 
placing some 100 independent agencies, administrations, boards, and 
commissions within the executive department. These independent 
agencies, the Report argued, constituted a "headless 'fourth 
branch'" acting ''under conditions of virtual irresponsibility,"147 
thereby frustrating the President's role as "the general manager of 
the United States." As conceived by the Report, the President's role 
was more confined than that claimed by President Reagan in Execu-
tive Order 12,291. The Report spoke only of the President as an 
143. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG,, 1ST SESS., REPORT ON 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in SENATE COMM, ON 
THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 1ST SESS., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr: LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY (1946) (hereinafter cited as APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
144. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRA• 
TIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1937) [hereinafter cited as 
BROWNLOW REPORT]. The Report was commissioned by President Roosevelt in 1936 to make 
a study of administrative management in the federal government. The study was conducted 
against a backdrop of opposition to the rapidly proliferating substantive programs of the New 
Deal, opposition which took the form of complaints, sometimes well founded, as to the fairness 
and regularity of the new agencies' procedures. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 34-35 (2d ed. 1980); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept oj Admin-
istrative Procedure, 18 CoLUM. L. REv. 258, 269-70, 273-74 (1978). 
145. Both the Senate and House reports on the APA acknowledge the Brownlow Report as 
the starting point for understanding the origins of the Act. See S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 3 (1945), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 143, at 189; H.R. REP. No. 
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 143, 
at 241-42. 
146. BROWNLOW REPoRT, supra note 144, at 41-42. 
147. Id. at 39-40. 
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efficient organizer and coordinator rather than as a source of admin-
istrative policy. Nonetheless, contemporary scholars raised constitu-
tional objections to even this more limited notion of the President as 
general manager, 148 and, significantly, Congress did not enact the 
Report's proposals. 
A second proposal to establish the principle of superior adminis-
trative control in the President for the entire executive branch was 
introduced in the Senate in 1949, shortly after the enactment of the 
AP A. This bill gave the President sweeping powers to control the 
administrative process. Functions vested by law in an agency, the 
bill declared, were also "vested in the President," and were exercised 
"pursuant to authority . . . derived from delegations by the Presi-
dent." Thus, executive agencies were "at all times subject . . . to the 
direction and control of the President."149 This bill was referred to 
the Senate Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments, 
where it quietly died. Congress's failure to endorse the proposals of 
the Brownlow Report or the Senate bill, admittedly, are not ideal 
indicators of its intent. Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to 
infer intent from Congress's failure to act. Unlike the Report of the 
Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, more-
over, the legislative materials offer no glimpse of Congress's reasons 
for rejecting the conception of the President's role advanced in the 
Brownlow Report or the Senate Bill. Nevertheless, an explanation 
that focuses on a desire to minimize the President's policy input is 
both plausible and consistent with the other, more explicit evidence 
of Congress's intent. 
There is admittedly some evidence for the view that "key execu-
tive policymakers" were not intended to be "isolated from each other 
and from the ChiefExecutive."150 Since Congress permits the Presi-
dent to appoint the sole director of an executive agency, in contrast 
to independent agencies whose several commissioners serve stag-
gered terms, it arguably does not intend that executive agencies be 
entirely immune from the President's policy suggestions. Congress's 
decision not to forbid ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, 
moreover, can be read to signify an intent to countenance presiden-
tial communications with the agencies about proposed rules. The 
evidence suggesting congressional approval of informal presidential 
148. See, e.g., Jaffee, supra note 19, at 1238. 
149. General Executive Management Act, S. 942, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). It is interest-
ing to note that this bill would have given the President authority to control the ''time, manner, 
and extent" of agencies' performance of their delegated functions. 
150. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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suasion, however, falls far short of justifying Executive Order 
12,29l's formalized control over administrative policy-making. As 
we have seen, a variety of sources - Congress's recent treatment of 
the 0MB, the limitations that it has imposed on the President's reor-
ganizational powers, its use of the legislative veto, and the legislative 
history of the AP A - evince Congress's desire to minimize more 
formalized control over agency rulemaking. Certainly no evidence 
exists to support the conclusion that Congress has implicitly dele-
gated the President authority to command adoption of a uniform, 
substantive methodology that is itself hotly debated within Congress. 
The argument presented above suggests that Congress meant to 
preclude a formalized presidential policy presence in the administra-
tive process and, by implication, to repose ultimate discretion on pol-
icy matters with the agencies. The scheme established by the AP A 
also supports a second, slightly different argument. The AP A, this 
argument asserts, gives the agencies considerable managerial discre-
tion, and impliedly prevents the President from imposing procedural 
requirements or delaying the timing of agency regulations. 151 
The procedural requirements established by the AP A for inf or-
mal rulemaking152 are few and simple. The agency must publish no-
tice of a proposed rule; allow, at its option, written or oral comments; 
and accompany final rules with "a concise general statement of their 
basis and purpose."153 The flexibility of informal rulemaking was a 
considered response to an earlier version of the AP A, 154 which ap-
151. See note 149 supra. 
152. The Act declares informal rulemaking to be the preferred method of agency rulemak-
ing. Formal rulemaking is limited to those situations where a statute specifically requires it, 
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1976): ''When rules are required by statute to be made on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title shall apply instead of 
this subsection." The Supreme Court has strictly adhered to this statutory preference. See, 
e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 234-38 (1973). 
153. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (1976). 
154. Critics of the Brownlow Report pushed for a highly judicialized procedural system, 
which received its embodiment in the Walter-Logan bill in 1939. S. 915, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 
84 CONG. REC. 668 (1939); H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 84 CONG. REC. 5561 (1939). With 
regard to adjudication, it created a dichotomy between single and multi-headed agencies and 
provided for trial-type hearings to be conducted by a three-member hearing board in single-
headed agencies and by a single examiner in multiheaded agencies. Any person "aggrieved" 
by a decision of any officer or employer of any agency could demand such a hearing. The 
rulemaking section provided that all rules "affecting the rights of persons or property" should 
be issued "only after publication of notice and public hearings." Rules under future statutes 
were to be issued within one year of the statute's enactment, and rules in existence for less than 
three years were to be reconsidered within one year after the bill became law "if any person 
substantially interested in the effects" of the rule so requested. Judicial review could be ob-
tained by any person "substantially interested in the effects of any administrative rule" in the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to determine whether such rule was in conflict 
with the Constitution or the statute under which it was promulgated. 
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plied "a procrustean procedural system"155 to the entire administra-
tive process. President Roosevelt, who vetoed the earlier bill, and, 
others criticized the bill because it ignored the "underlying diversi-
ties" of agencies "different in structure and function." 156 Recogniz-
ing the validity of these objections, Congress designed the AP A to 
leave "wide latitude for each agency to frame its own procedures."157 
The Act rejects the notion that a central source such as Congress or 
the proposed Federal Office of Administrative Procedure should de-
vise extensive and uniform procedures for agency rulemaking. Be-
yond the statute's minimum requirements, each individual agency 
has maximum discretion to fashion procedures that accord with its 
perception of "considerations of practicality, necessity, and public 
interest." 158 
This view of the Act's legislative history has been confirmed by 
155. Verkuil, S11pra note 144, at 277. 
156. Veto Message of the President, 86 CoNG. REc. 13,942-43. The Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York said: "[W]e think the present bill, under the guise of reform, would 
force administrative and departmental agencies having a wide variety of functions into a single 
mold which is so rigid, so needlessly interfering, as to bring about a widespread crippling of 
the administrative process." Report of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York, quoted in 
id at 13,943. 
157. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 256. See also S. REP. No. 752, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1945), 
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 198. 
The influence of the Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure is again apparent With particular regard to the rulemaking process, the scheme 
should be adapted to giving adequate opportunity to all persons affected to present their 
views, the facts within their knowledge, and the dangers and benefits of alternative 
courses. They should also be adapted to eliciting, far more systematically and specifically 
than a legislature can achieve, the information, facts, and probabilities which are neces-
sary to fair and intelligent action. 
FINAL REPORT, S11pra note 141, at 98. The choice of the manner and means necessary to 
accumulate the information required to promulgate a fair rule is to be left to the sound discre-
tion of the agencies themselves: "Here, as elsewhere in the administrative process, ultimate 
reliance must be on administrative good faith." Id at 104. 
158. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946), reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, S11pra note 143, at 259. See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1945), 
reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Sllpra note 143, at 200-01. 
This general objective of maintaining individual agency integrity and flexibility in the in-
formal rulemaking process reflected in the legislative history of the Act, and also in the general 
provisions of§ 553, is most clearly established by the specific requirement of§ 553(e) that 
agencies allow the public to request the initiation of a rulemaking proceeding: "Each agency 
shall give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a 
rule." 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). The legislative history of the section and the case law inter-
preting it make it abundantly clear that the decision to act on such a petition is committed 
solely to the agency being petitioned and its decision is final, though subject to limited judicial 
review in certain circumstances. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S11pra note 143, at 258 (Sen-
ate Report), 260 (House Report); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE Acr 38-39 (1947). The Attorney General's Manual is normally accorded consid-
erable deference because of the role the Attorney General played in drafting the legislation. 
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 546 (1978). 
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the courts. The case law has consistently affirmed agencies' discre-
tion to decide exactly how they will conduct their rulemaking activi-
ties. The Supreme Court, for example, has upheld an agency's 
decision to promulgate rules through adjudication rather than infor-
mal rulemaking, 159 and the choice of informal rulemaking over a 
formal hearing on the record when the agency's statute did not 
clearly require the formal process. 160 And, in Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources .Defense Council, Inc. ,161 the 
Court strongly endorsed an agency's unqualified discretion in infor-
mal rulemaking to adopt only the minimal procedures prescribed by 
the AP A. 162 Vermont Yankee is especially relevant here because the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, like President Rea-
gan, had claimed that its competing constitutional duties authorized 
the imposition of procedures beyond the statutory minimum. In par-
ticular, the D.C. Circuit relied on its constitutional obligation of ju-
dicial review to justify its action. In an opinion remarkable for its 
reproving tone, the Court upheld the agency's discretion against the 
countervailing interests of the judiciary. After reviewing the legisla-
tive history and the relevant judicial precedent, the Court declared: 
"In short, all of this leaves little doubt that Congress intended that 
the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be exercised 
in determining when extra procedural devices should be em-
ployed." 163 Under this reading of the Act, the President, notwith-
standing his constitutional obligations, should likewise be denied 
authority to require additional procedures of an agency. His action, 
no less than that of the D.C. Circuit in Vermont Yankee, constitutes 
a "serious departure from the very basic tenet of administrative law 
that agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of 
procedure."164 
Executive Order 12,291's interference with an agency's freedom 
to fashion its own procedures is remarkable. A partial list of the 
additional procedures required by the Order includes: 
(1) preparation of a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to publica-
159. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290.95 (1974). 
160. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
161. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
162. The Coun brought a halt to a trend of lower court decisions that sought to influence 
the process of regulatory policy-making by judicially imposing procedural requirements on 
informal rulemaking beyond those required by the APA. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. 
FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Portland Cement Assn. v. 
Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). 
163. 435 U.S. at 546 (emphasis in original). 
164. 435 U.S. at 544. 
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tion of proposed and final rules;165 
(2) consultation with the Director of the 0MB, at his request, con-
cerning proposed rules;I66 
(3) preparation of a legal memorandum determining that a final 
rule is "clearly" within the agency's statutory authority; 167 
(4) determining that an adopted final rule have substantial support 
in the rulemaking record;168 
(5) initiation, at the request of the Director of the 0MB, of cost-
benefit review of an agency's existing regulations;169 and 
(6) delaying the effective date of an adopted fU:le until the Director 
of the 0MB has responded to the Regulatory Impact Analysis accom-
panying the final rule and the agency has responded to the Director's 
comments.170 
These additional procedural steps, one might reasonably conclude, 
are well-advised. Indeed, recent legislative proposals considered by 
Congress have incorporated many of the Order's procedural fea-
tures.171 However desirable, these procedures are inconsistent with 
the AP A, and as Congress has recognized, the Act must be amended 
before such procedural requirements can become law. 
Executive Order 12,291 stands in direct opposition to the infor-
mal rulemaking provisions of the APA and to the Act's legislative 
history. 172 The Order effectively allows the Director of 0MB to de-
termine when an agency must undertake rulemaking, contrary to 
section 553( e ); prescribes the procedures that an agency must follow 
in its rulemaking; requires the use of the substantive principles of 
cost-benefit analysis; and superimposes a central coordinating au-
165. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,194-95 (1981). 
166. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f)(l), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
167. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 4(a), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
168. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 4(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
169. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(i}, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
170. Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(f), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
171. See note 110 supra and accompanying text. 
172. Nothing has occurred legislatively to the APA since 1946 that would support such 
presidential action. Its basic structure is the same today as it was in 1946. The amendments to 
the Act have, if anything, reinforced the original scheme. Thus the Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. 
L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 378 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)) (amended 1967), imposed 
an obligation on the agencies to grant public access to agency records unless specifically ex-
empted from disclosure. In 1974, continuing criticism of the agencies for undue•secrecy led to 
further amendments of§ 552 designed to tighten the exemptions and to penalize agency non-
compliance with the Act. Freedom of Information Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 
1561-64 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). The coverage of the Act was 
expanded to embrace the Executive Office of the President. Freedom of Information Act, § 3 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(e) (1976)). Finally, the Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976 
added an open meetings requirement as well as a prohibition against ex parte contacts in 
formal ex parte rulemaking. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified at 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 552(b), 557(d) (1976)). These changes are consonant with the public participation and pub-
lic disclosure themes evident in the original Act. They in no way support the substantial over-
haul effected by Executive Order 12,291. 
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thority over all agency rulemaking, despite Congress's rejection of 
the general manager approach of the Brownlow Report, its rejection 
of the Federal Office of Administrative Procedure, and its general 
rejection of uniform procedures that reduce the flexibility that is the 
hallmark of informal rulemaking. As the previous section demon-
strated, Executive Order 12,291 must receive strong legislative sup-
port to survive Justice Jackson's separation of powers test. Because 
the Order falls within Congress's exclusive domain, it can be upheld 
only if Congress has implicitly delegated the President authority to 
promulgate it. _ 
Yet Congress has not delegated the President authority to pro-
mulgate the unprecedented regulatory oversight scheme established 
by Executive Order 12,291. Instead of a delegation, one can, in fact, 
discern an affirmative intent to deny the President authority to pro-
mulgate both the substantive and the procedural features of the Or-
der. Thus, whether viewed as within Congress's exclusive domain or 
within the nebulous zone of concurrent authority, Executive Order 
12,291 violates the constitutional separation of powers. 
II. PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL AND Ex PARTE CONTACTS 
Executive Order 12,291 commands the early intervention of the 
President's closest aides and advisers in the agency rulemaking pro-
cess. In so doing, the Order greatly increases the opportunities for 
off-the-record, ex parte contacts between executive agencies engaged 
in rulemaking and the White House. Presidential advisers are likely 
to use their oversight positions not only to comment on the agencies' 
cost-benefit analyses, but also to convey informally their views about 
the agencies' rulemaking activities. 173 Although such contacts ar-
guably disrupt the kind of rulemaking proceedings contemplated by 
the AP A and undoubtedly raise serious questions of fairness, Execu-
tive Order 12,291 provides no safeguards whatsoever to protect the 
integrity of the rulemaking process. Over the past few years, courts 
and commentators have debated the extent to which ex parte con-
tacts should be prohibited or controlled in informal rulemaking pro-
ceedings.174 A host of competin_g considerations have informed this 
173. This aspect of the Order's oversight mechanism has already aroused concern. See 
note 10 supra. To minimize the potential dangers associated with secret White House contacts, 
Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.) has proposed that copies of all written and "significant" oral 
comments from the 0MB to an agency regarding a proposed rule be included in the rulemak-
ing file. See LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Oct. 5, 1981, at 5. 
114. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298,400 n.500 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing cases); 
Carberry, Ex Parle Communications in Off-The-Record Administrative Proceedings: A Proposed 
Limitation on Judicial Innovation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 65; Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agen-
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interesting debate. In 1976, Congress amended the APA to prohibit 
ex parte contacts in formal, on-the-record rulemaking, but chose not 
to extend the blanket prohibition to informal rulemaking. 175 Never-
theless, concerns for reasoned administrative decision-making, 176 ef-
ficacious judicial review, 177 fairness, 178 and meaningful public 
participation 179 argue in favor of restricting ex parte contacts in in-
formal rulemaking in certain circumstances. Vermont Yankee, how-
ever, seemingly calls for judicial restraint in the area. The issue 
des: Ex Parle Contacts by the While House, 80 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 943 (1980); Note, .Due Process 
and Ex Parle Contacts in Informal Rf!lemaking, 89 YALE L.J. 194 (1979). 
175. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d)(l) (1976). Ex parte contacts are defined by the APA as "oral or 
written communication[s] not on the public record with respect to which reasonable public 
notice to all parties is not given .... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(14) (1976). The prohibition applies to 
any "interested person outside the agency." 
176. The courts have insisted that there be reasoned agency decision-making based on 
some kind of record. Ex parte comments negate the opportunity for outside parties to com-
ment on their substance. The lack of such adversarial discussion of the merits of the comments 
is seen as weakening the agency's decision: "From a functional standpoint, we see no differ-
ence between assertions of facts and expert opinion tendered by the public, as here, and that 
generated internally in an agency: each may be bi,ased, inaccurate, or incomplete - failings 
which adversary comment may eliminate." Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978). 
177 .... As a practical matter, Overton Park's mandate means that the public record 
must reflect what representations were made to an agency so that relevant information 
supporting or refuting those representations may be brought to the attention of the re-
viewing courts by persons participating in agency proceedings. This course is obviously 
foreclosed if the agency itself does not disclose the information presented. Moreover, 
where, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to information in the pub-
lic file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has been 
presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted properly, 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 415, 419-20; see K. Davis, 
Administrative Law ef the Seventies § 11.00 at 317 (1976), but must treat the agency's 
justifications as a fictional account of the actual decision-making process and must 
perforce find its actions arbitrary. See Ruppert v. Washington, 366 F. Supp. 686, 690 
(D.D.C. 1973), qffirmed by order, D.C. Cir. No. 73-1985 (Oct. 26, 1976). 
567 F.2d at 54. See also Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
178. The Home Box Office court also recognized that secret communications wit!!_ agency 
decision-makers are inconsistent "with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process 
and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on the merits.· ... " 567 F.2d at 56. See 
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
179. Agency decisions are to be made after a full public airing of all relevant issues and 
factual disputes. Sangamon Valley Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221,224 (D.C. 
Cir. 1959). Public participation is a crucial aspect of this principle. But ex parte communica-
tions may nullify that participation. Due process, therefore, requires that such contacts be 
restricted...to the greatest extent possible. Home Box Office v. FCC, .55/ F..2d 9, 56 (D.C. Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978). 
A similar conclusion was reached in United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime 
Commn., 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Although the case in}'.olved an informal adjudication, 
the court noted that the "quasi-adjudicatory" procedure.in_-question had to be protected 
against ex parte communications because the impact of ·agep.im action would extend "well 
beyond the immediate parties involved." 584 F.2d at 539. Thcfci>urt added that "however we 
label the proceedings involved here and in our earlier cases, the common theme remains: that 
ex parte communications and agency secrecy as to their substance and existence serve effec-
tively to deprive the public of the right to participate meaningfully in the decisionmaking 
process." 584 F.2d at 539. 
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becomes even more complicated where, as here, the contacts occur 
between executive agencies and the White House. While the Presi-
dent's article II duties and the concept of executive privilege sanc-
tioned in United States v. Nixon 180 arguably should give the 
President greater leeway to contact those agencies, his enormous in-
fluence over them increases the need for restraints. 
Balancing these conflicting concerns, this Part proposes that cer-
tain judicially enforced limitations on ex parte contacts between 
presidential advisers and executive agencies accompany Executive 
Order 12,291. Where the rulemaking is of an adjudicatory nature, 
due process dictates that the substance of the ex parte communica-
tions be publicly disclosed in the rulemaking docket. Even where 
the rulemaking does not adjudicate individual rights, certain guide-
lines must be observed. White House contacts should be publicly 
disclosed, for example, where the President or his advisers are acting 
as a conduit for information received from interested private parties. 
In cases where the President or his advisers simply convey the Ad-
ministration's policy, however, a strong case can still be made for 
disclosure of the existence, if not the substance, of such ex parte com-
munications in the rulemaking docket. On a case-by-case basis, 
courts should invalidate agency action where the White House fails 
to conform to the guidelines outlined above. 
A. Ex Parle Contacts in Informal Adjudications 
The AP A makes no provision for informal adjudications - adju-
dications unaccompanied by the protections of a formal, judicial 
trial. To conserve their resources, many agencies therefore hold ad-
judicatory proceedings under the AP A's informal rulemaking provi-
sions. Since these informal adjudications involve individual rights 
rather than issues of general policy, they implicate constitutional due 
process values. 181 Although due process does not generally require a 
full-scale judicial trial, informal adjudications must nevertheless 
conform to the "fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due 
process."182 
Ex parte contacts may undermine the due process rights of par-
ties to informal adjudications in several important respects. By de-
priving the parties to the adjudication of notice and an opportunity 
180. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
181. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Carberry, supra note 174, at 98-99; Verkuil, supra note 174, at 982. 
182. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 56 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1978). 
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to respond to relevant information, ex parte contacts violate funda-
mental canons of fairness. 183 Moreover, the impartiality and objec-
tivity of the decisi~n-maker, qualities traditionally regarded as 
essential to due process, are compromised by ex parte contacts.184 
Such contacts, as one commentator has stated, create "a fertile bed 
for arbitrary administrative action."185 
While the "poisonous" effects of ex parte contacts are pro-
nounced in an adjudicatory setting, the reasons for judicial restraint 
are attenuated. First, Vermont Yankee's message that courts should 
be wary of imposing additional procedural requirements on informal 
administrative rulemaking does not apply to adjudications implicat-
ing due process values. The Vermont Yankee Court explicitly quali-
fied its holding, stating: "[W]hen an agency is making a 'quasi-
judicial' determination . . . in some circumstances additional proce-
dures may be required in order to afford the aggrieved individuals 
due process."186 Second, the President's article II .duties are not im-
paired by restrictions on ex parte contacts between the White House 
and executive agencies in informal adjudications. The President's 
authority is necessarily circumscribed in an area more closely related 
to the judicial than to the executive sphere. In the words of one 
scholar: "There is no inherent executive power to control the rights 
of individuals in an adjudicative setting." 187 Third, because the 
President's article II powers are of dubious applicability in such a 
setting, claims of executive privilege, a doctrine that analytically 
should encompass only activities properly within the executive 
power, are also of questionable validity. The due process interests 
present in adjudicatory proceedings, moreover, should override the 
limited concept of executive privilege established in United States v. 
183. Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that execution of a prejudgment 
writ of replevin without hearing or notice to the affected party Yiolates due process). 
For more than a century the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 
"Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they 
may enjoy that right they must first be notified." It is equally fundamental that the right 
to notice and an opportunity to be heard "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner." 
407 U.S. at 80 (citations omitted). 
184. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (''Not only is a biased decisionmaker con-
stitutionally unacceptable but 'our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the 
probability of unfairness.' ") (citations omitted). See note 176 supra. 
185. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watch-
dogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 228 (1978). 
186. 435 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted). "Where agency action resembles judicial action, 
where it involves . . . quasi-adjudication among 'conflicting claims to a valuable private privi-
lege,' the insulation of the decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is justified by basic notions of 
due process to the parties involved.'' Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
187. Verkuil, supra note 174, at 982. 
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Nixon. 188 In sum, because the President's authority is at a low ebb 
and sensitive due process concerns are involved, informal adjudica-
tions present an especially strong case for restricting ex parte 
contacts. 
The line between an adjudication, where due process applies, and 
a policy-type rulemaking, where due process does not apply, will 
often be difficult to draw. The Supreme Court has, on several occa-
sions, attempted to shed some light on the distinction. In United 
States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 189 for example, the Court dis-
tinguished between "proceeding[s] for the purpose of promulgating 
policy-type rules or standards, on the one hand, and proceedings 
designed to adjudicate disputed facts in particular cases, on the 
other."190 More recently, the Vermont Yankee Court declared that 
an agency conducts an adjudication when it makes "a 'quasi-judi-
cial' determination by which a very small number of persons are 'ex-
ceptionally affected in each case upon individual grounds.' " 191 Yet 
the distinction between policy-type and adjudicatory determinations 
is often blurred; administrative proceedings often combine both ad-
judicatory and policy-making features. United States Lines, Inc. v. 
Federal Maritime Commission,192 one of the more recent ex parte 
contacts cases, illustrates this point. In United States Lines, the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission was required to decide whether certain 
named parties were entitled to an exemption from the antitrust laws. 
So described, the Commission's proceedings satisfied the Vermont 
Yankee definition of an adjudication, but the proceedings also re-
quired policy-making since the Commission was "charged with en-
forcing and guarding the public interest, with the impact of its 
decision extending well beyond the immediate parties involved."193 
The frequent admixture of policy-making and adjudicatory ele-
ments in informal agency proceedings suggests the need for a flexible 
solution to the problem of White House contacts. Rather than 
prohibiting White House contacts, the most sensible solution would 
require public disclosure of the substance of all such contacts in the 
rulemaking docket whenever the proceeding has an adjudicatory 
component. Because disclosure allows affected parties to respond to 
relevant information and enables courts to determine whether 
188. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
189. 410 U.S. 224 (1973). 
190. 410 U.S. at 245. 
191. 435 U.S. at 542 (citations omitted). 
192. 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
193. 584 F.2d at 540. 
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agency decisions are based on legitimate factors, this requirement 
adequately protects the due process interests threatened by ex parte 
contacts. By allowing ex parte contacts between the White House 
and executive agencies to occur, the proposed requirement also de-
fers to the President's legitimate desire to suggest general policies. 
If the proceeding under review was adjudicatory, even in part, 
therefore, courts should invalidate agency action where agency com-
munications with White House officials charged with oversight re-
sponsibilities under Executive Order 12,291 have not been publicly 
revealed. 
B. Ex Parle Contacts in I'!formal Policy-Making Proceedings 
A more vexing problem concerns the legitimacy of unrecorded 
and unreviewable White House communications in policy-type in-
formal rulemakings. When the proceedings involve no adjudicatory 
component, the argument for disclosure of these communications 
cannot be bolstered by reference to the need to preserve due process. 
One must recognize, moreover, that article II of the Constitution au-
thorizes the President to supervise and coordinate policy-making 
pr9ceedings, at least by using facilitative measures and making pol-
icy suggestions. And Vermont Yankee's instruction that courts 
should not fashion additional procedures to further "some vague, 
undefined public good"194 suggests that a disclosure requirement 
must find a solid statutory basis. 
The AP A furnishes two possible bases for a requirement that ex 
parte contacts be publicly disclosed. First, secret ex parte contacts 
arguably undermine section 553's provision for "notice and com-
ment" participation by interested parties.195 Second, section 706's 
provision for judicial review under an arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard can be read to require that significant contacts be included in 
the record available to a reviewing court.196 Although these argu-
ments are plausible, courts have declined to adopt a general disclo-
sure requirement in informal rulemakings under the AP A.197 
Retreating from broad language in an earlier case, the D.C. Circuit 
held inAction For Children's Television v. FCC198 that the APA does 
194. 435 U.S. at 549. 
195. 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1976). 
196. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). Section 706, which apparently applies to all of the Act's scope-
of-review provisions, provides in part: "In making the foregoing determinations, the court 
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error." 
197. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
198. 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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not warrant a logging requirement that applies generally in informal 
rulemaking proceedings. 
Although the Children's Television court's conclusion appears 
sound, it does not address the more specific situation where ex parte 
communications are cloaked with the authority of the presidential 
office. The President's personal and institutional power will un-
doubtedly lead agencies to attribute more weight to communications 
emanating from his office than to communications originating with 
private parties. Isolated off-the-record contacts between agencies 
and private parties, the sort of contact that Congress probably did 
not intend generally to preclude, are unlikely to affect the decision-
making process significantly. But the regular ex parte communica-
tions initiated by the White House under Executive Order 12,291 
might undercut the AP A's provision for public participation. Surely, 
Congress did not expect that interested parties would be unaware of 
information or arguments that will figure so prominently in the 
agencies' decisions. Yet if influential White House contacts are per-
mitted to occur in secrecy, interested parties will have little incentive 
to prepare the information and arguments that agencies have found 
so valuable in the past. Public participation would indeed be re-
duced to a "sham."199 
In addition to diminishing the value of public participation, se-
cret White House communications impair the quality of judicial re-
view. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,200 the 
Supreme Court held that the APA's arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard of review requires courts to conduct a "searching and careful" 
inquiry based on "the full administrative record that was before the 
[agency official] at the time he made his decision."201 Secret, unre-
ported communications that nevertheless play a vital role in the 
agency's decision prevent courts from performing effectively the 
searching review contemplated by Overton Park.202 
Despite the heightened need to control White House communica-
tions, the D.C. Circuit recently refused to require the disclosure of ex 
parte presidential communications. In Sierra Club v. Costle,203 Pres-
ident Carter had met with officials of the EPA to discuss proposed 
rules after the close of the notice and comment period. The court 
199. United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
200. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
201. 401 U.S. at 416, 420. 
202. See United States Lines v. Federal Maritime Commn., 584 F.2d 519, 541-42 (D.C. 
Cir. 1978). 
203. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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held that the agency's failure to docket the meeting in its rulemaking 
record did not violate the Clean Air Act. Although the Act requires 
that all documents ''which the Administrator determines to be of 
central relevance to the rulemaking" be placed in the record, 204 the 
Sierra Club court stated that nondisclosure was legal "since EPA 
makes no effort to base the rule on any 'data or information' arising 
from [the presidential contact]."205 The court's conclusion that judi-
cial review does not demand "that courts know the details of every 
White House contact, including a Presidential one, in this informal 
rulemaking setting"206 however, may be limited to the facts of the 
case. Judicial review in Sierra Club was made possible by specific 
provisions of the Clean Air Act, which require that rules find the 
requisite factual support in the record and prohibit rules based in 
whole or in part on any "data or information" not in the record.207 
Had the particular statute in issue not contained these review-facili-
tating provisions, the court might well have reached a different 
conclusion. 
When one compares the Clean Air Act and Executive Order 
12,291, it becomes apparent that the rationale underlying the legal 
acceptability of the undisclosed presidential contacts in Sierra Club 
ddes not legitimize all presidential contacts under the Order. Most 
executive agencies are not subject to justificatory requirements as 
stringent as those of the Clean Air Act. Since the AP A does not 
explicitly require that these agencies rely only on docketed informa-
tion, they must satisfy only the disclosure requirements implicit in 
Overton Park. Although Executive Order 12,291, unlike the APA, 
demands that agency decisions receive substantial factual support in 
the record, it does not require that agency decisions be based entirely 
on recorded information.208 This comparatively weak limitation on 
presidential influence, combined with the regularity with which 
White Hou~e ·contacts will probably occur under the Order,209 mean 
204. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. II 1978). 
205. 657 F.2d at 407. 
206. 657 F.2d at 407. 
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(6)(C) (Supp. II 1978). 
208. Exec. Order 12,291 § 4(b), 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,195 (1981). 
209. See generally Verkuil, supra note 174, at 950-51. Indeed, these contacts may be en-
couraged by the 0MB: 
0MB staff possess far less e~rtise than agency staff on specialized regulatory issues, and 
in the short time available will not be able to read, let alone understand, the voluminous 
rulemaking records. Instead, pMB is likely to view the issues from a political or ideologi-
cal perspective, relying on the arguments of White House political advisors or special 
interest lobbyists. The tendency will be particularly pronounced when major political 
supporters of the White House incumbent become interested in a proceeding. 
C. LUDLAM, supra note I, at 18. 
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that the need for disclosure of these contacts is greater than in Sierra 
Club. 
The reasoning of the Sierra Club court, moreover, is vulnerable 
to criticism. In holding that the substance of the presidential contact 
need not be divulged, the court relied heavily on the President's arti-
cle II authority to monitor and contribute to administrative policy-
making. This consideration certainly favors allowing presidential 
contacts to occur, but its relevance as an argument against disclosure 
of those contacts rests on an unstated assumption: namely, that dis-
closure will adversely affect the President's policy-making authority. 
This assumption is arguably supported by the President's presump-
tive privilege of confidentiality. In United States v. Nixon,210 the 
Supreme Court declared that "[a] President and those who assist him 
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies 
and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwill-
ing to express except privately."211 
It is doubtful, however, that the President's privilege of confiden-
tiality properly applies in the Sierra Club situation. Nixon dealt with 
communications between the President and his closest advisers. In 
Sierra Club, by way of contrast, the President's communications 
were directed at an executive agency in the exercise of essentially 
legislative responsibilities - an area where, as Part I argued, the 
President's authority must be carefully delimited. A disclosure re-
quirement might well hinder presidential efforts to (?Ontrol adminis-
trative policy-making. But, so long as the President remains free to 
thrash out alternatives secretly with his closest advisers, it is doubtful 
that disclosure would greatly impede his ability to recommend poli-
cies to executive agencies. The Nixon Court, moreover, held that a 
demonstrable need for disclosure may overcome the limited privi-
lege of confidentiality.212 Here the publicity that the Constitution 
demands of the legislative process, the public participation in 
rulemaking contemplated by the APA, and the Act's provision for 
judicial review all point to the desirability of disclosure. United 
States v. Nixon thus fails to support the Sierra Club court's assump-
tion that the President's article II powers impliedly protect the confi-
dentiality of ex parte presidential communications. 
Accordingly, courts should require that the substance of ex parte 
210. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
211. 418 U.S. at 708. See Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 32S 
(D.D.C. 1966). 
212. 418 U.S. at 713. 
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communications between White House and agency officials be dis-
closed in the rulemaking docket. 
Even if courts accept Sierra Club's expansive view of presidential 
authority and refuse to adopt the generalized disclosure requirement 
stated above, one can still defend a disclosure requirement limited to 
conduit contacts, through which the President relays the views of pri-
vate parties to agency officials. Nongovernmental interests, recog-
nizing that Executive Order 12,291 creates a new point of access to 
the decision-making process, may attempt to utilize the White House 
or the 0MB as a conduit for their views, thereby covertly influencing 
agency rulemaking. In such instances there is usually no public 
knowledge of the contact or of what was communicated.213 Com-
mentators have been especially troubled by the prospect of the Presi-
dent, in effect, lobbying on behalf of private parties.214 Professor 
Verkuil, for example, has expressed concern for the integrity of the 
governmental process 
when White House actions reflect the interests of private industry in 
emphasizing a cost-minimization regulatory policy. Powerful private 
lobbies, increasingly frustrated in obtaining preferential access to ad-
ministrators, can be expected to use White House political advisors to 
achieve equivalent clout. The expressed fear is that government regu-
lation will be co-opted by private groups through the intercession of 
the White House.215 
Because private parties can always communicate directly with an 
agency, the White House serves only to magnify the influence of in-
terested private parties who seek a particular result in rulemaking 
proceedings.216 It is not difficult to conclude that Congress did not 
213. The Freedom of Information Act is ofno aid in such situations since the communica-
tions are usually oral and thus not discoverable. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976). 
214. See Bruff, supra note 26, at 466,504; John & Litan, Sierra Club v. Costle-Regula-
tory Oversight Wins in Court, REGULATION, July/ Aug. 1981, at 17, 23-24; Verkuil, supra note 
174, at 981. 
215. Verkuil, supra note 174, at 950-51. 
216. Direct ex-parte approaches by lobbyists to agency officials are serious enough but 
0MB dealings with these lobbyists raise other troubling possibilities. If persons interested 
in a proceeding have ex-parte communications with 0MB, rather than with the agency, 
and 0MB then communicates those views to the agency without identifying the source of 
its information, the views will be invested with OMB's authority, rather than seen as 
merely another partisan argument by a special interest participant. In this example, 0MB 
serves as an influential back-door "conduit" for communicating the views ofpnvate par-
ties to the agency. ' 
C. LUDLAM, supra note I, at 40. 
Ludlam continues: 
The intent of the White House to use the regulatory process to assist political allies 
seems clear. In an April 10, 1981, speech before the Chamber of Commerce, Boyden 
Gray, the Vice President's Counsel and Counsel to the Task Force on Regulatory Relief, 
invited the audience to bring their regulatory problems to the White House. He said, 
If you go the agency first, don't be too pessimistic if they can't solve the problem there. 
If they don't, that's what the Task Force is for. 
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intend the informality of the AP A's rulemaking provisions to legiti-
mize behind-the-scenes favoritism. 
The Sierra Club court recognized, but did not resolve, the con-
duit contacts problem. Noting that the Carter Justice Department 
had recommended that all conduit contacts be placed in the 
rulemaking record,217 the court found "no reason to believe that a 
policy similar to this was not followed here, or that unrecorded con-
duit communications exist in this case."218 Accordingly, the court 
refused to authorize further discovery on the issue. 
There are strong reasons to believe that Executive Order 12,291 
will create a conduit contact problem far more serious than that per-
ceived by the Sierra Club court. In funneling all agency rules 
through one coordinating agency, the 0MB, the Order makes avail-
able to interested private parties a new access point to the decision-
making process. In addition, the Order provides only minimal safe-
guards against improper favoritism. In contrast to guidelines devel-
oped under the Carter Administration, the OMB's current position is 
that not all oral and written communications with private parties 
need to be summarized and disclosed in the rulemaking record. A 
recent memorandum simply advises officials involved in the Order's 
oversight program to advise private parties submitting "factual 
materials" to refer such matters to the responsible agency.219 The 
oral statements, policy views, and legal arguments of private parties 
apparently escape the memorandum's relatively weak referral re-
quirement. Thus, the oversight mechanism established by Executive 
Order 12,291 is rife with the potential for abuse. 
A requirement that all White House communications with agen-
cies regarding a proposed rule during the pendency of rulemaking 
proceedings be accompanied by disclosure of relevant communica-
tions from interested private parties received by the President or his 
advisers while those proceedings were pending would place a needed 
Id. at 50. 
217. See Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Memorandum for Hon. Cecil D. 
Andrus, ·secretary of Interior, Re: Consultation With Council of Economic Advisers Concern-
ing Rulemaking Under Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (undated), reprinted in 
LEGAL TIMES OF WASH., Jan. 29, 1979, at 32-33. 
218. 657 F.2d at 405 n.520. 
219. Certain Communications Pursuant to Executive Order No. 12,291, "Federal Regula-
tion" (memorandum from David A. Stockman, Director, 0MB, to heads of executive depart-
ments and agencies, June 11, 1981) (copy on file with the Michigan Law Review). See LEOAL 
TIMES OF WASH., June 22, 1981, at 1, 11. The memo, issued by 0MB, "does not require 0MB 
to log contacts with outsiders on regulatory issues or notify concerned agencies of such con-
tacts." Id. at 1. One observer points out that "factual materials" "does not appear to cover 
oral communications, which are the primary means of communications at OMB." Id. at 11. 
Submissions of policy or legal analysis may also escape coverage under the 0MB memo. Id. 
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check on this potential for abuse. This requirement emphasizes that 
the relevant agency, not the White House, was meant to be the pri-
mary forum for communication of technical data, policy views, and 
legal arguments. By making agencies aware of the source of infor-
mation and arguments presented by the President and his advisers in 
rulemaking proceedings, the requirement should ensure that no un-
due weight is given to the views of interested parties with allies in the 
White House. 
Although one may consider overly broad a general disclosure re-
quirement applicable to White House policy communications, obvi-
ous problems would arise in applying a more limited conduit 
communication disclosure rule. The difficulty lies in distinguishing 
between policy positions of private parties and those of the White 
House: The President and his advisers might adopt as their own the 
views privately urged by interested parties. Despite this ostensible 
classificatory dilemma, it is undesirable to limit a conduit contact 
disclosure rule to material factual information.22° First, the possibil-
ity that the White House will lend its credibility to a private position 
due to mere favoritism exists with regard to policy and legal argu-
ments as well as to factual information. Second, interested parties 
must rebut and reviewing courts must scrutinize not only the factual 
data presented in rulemaking proceedings, but also the policy and 
legal arguments that an agency has considered. Finally, a rule re-
quiring that White House comments on proposed rules be accompa-
nied by disclosure of private communications received by the 
President and his advisers during the pendency of the rulemaking 
proceedings will not unduly constrain expressions of White House 
policy to agency decision-makers: Presidential aides remain free 
both to communicate their own views and to endorse the views of 
private parties. 
Ex parte contacts give rise to concerns that vary somewhat ac-
cording to the nature of the rulemaking - whether adjudicatory or 
policy-making - and the type of communication - whether direct 
from the White House or a so-called conduit contact. One can make 
a virtually unassailable argument for a disclosure requirement in ad-
220. Co=entators have argued that ex parte contacts that co=unicate significant new 
information should be logged on a public record. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE§ 6:18 (2d ed. 1978). Apparently realizing the difficulty or arbitrariness in distin-
guishing between information and argument, the Administrative Law Conference has recom-
mended that agencies "experiment in appropriate situations with procedures designed to 
disclose oral co=unications from outside the agency of significant information or argument 
respecting the merits of proposed rules." l C.F.R. § 205.77-3 (1980) (Admin. Conf. of the 
United States, Ex Parte Co=UD,ications in Informal Rulemaking Proceedings, Rec. No. 77-3) 
(emphasis added). 
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judicatory rulemaking proceedings. As both Vermont Yankee and 
Sierra Club recognize, courts may justifiably intervene to protect the 
due process rights of affected individuals. But the overwhelming 
strength of the argument in an adjudicatory setting should not lead 
one to conclude that a disclosure requirement is not warranted in 
other settings as well. Although competing considerations based on 
the President's article II powers and responsibilities come to the fore 
in policy-type rulemakings, an undeniable need for disclosure re-
mains. That need is perhaps greatest in the conduit contact situa-
tion, where the danger of arbitrary decision-making is especially 
pronounced. 
CONCLUSION 
Executive Order 12,291 exceeds the proper bounds of presiden-
tial authority. By imposing a substantive cost-benefit requirement, 
the Order displaces the discretion of agency officials to formulate 
domestic policy. It thus significantly interferes with a function over 
which the Constitution gives Congress primary, if not exclusive con-
trol. Althoqgh the President is authorized to coordinate and super-
vise the executive branch, he has no inherent authority to control 
executive agencies executing essentially legislative duties delegated 
to the agencies by Congress. And Congress's evident desire to deny 
the President formalized control over administrative policy-making 
effectively refutes the claim that the President has concurrent author-
ity in the area. The President's authority to force executive agencies 
to use procedures in addition to those mandated by the APA in in-
formal rulemaking is similarly attenuated. The rather extensive ar-
ray of procedures that the Order requires impinges on the 
informality and flexibility that the APA contemplates. 
A complete discussion of Executive Order 12,291's legitimacy 
must mention the serious problem of secret ex parte contacts raised 
by the Order. It is reasonable to expect that informal and undis-
closed messages will regularly fl.ow in the more formal chamiel of 
communication between the 0MB and executive agencies that the 
Order establishes. The 0MB oversight mechanism, moreover, cre-
ates a new and influential entry point to the rulemaking process that 
private parties with allies in the White House will seek to exploit. 
The dilemma posed by unrecorded ex parte contacts is especially 
acute where, as here, the communications occur between White 
House and agency officials - these communications become 
weighted with the prestige and authority of the presidential office. 
To ensure fidelity to due process and the integrity of informal 
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rulemaking as envisaged by Congress, courts should require that sig-
nificant White House contacts be disclosed in the rulemaking docket. 
During the 1980 presidential campaign, candidate Reagan prom-
ised to unshackle the free enterprise system and "to relieve the small 
business man of the burdens of excessive regulation."221 The bloated 
pledges characteristic of modem presidential campaigns help perpet-
uate the image of a President possessing virtually unbounded au-
thority. The reality, of course, is that the President's unilateral 
authority to implement his domestic policies is subject to powerful 
constitutional and statutory co~traints. 
221. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1980, § B, at 4, col. 6. 
